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COUNTING CASUALTIES IN COMMUNITIES HIT HARDEST  
BY THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
 
Matthew J. Rossman* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well established that the fiscal and foreclosure crisis that gripped the global 
economy beginning in late 2006 had a devastating impact on American 
homeowners. The number of foreclosures quadrupled.1 Eight million U.S. 
households (one of every six households with a mortgage) were involved in a 
foreclosure proceeding, and five million lost their homes to foreclosure.2 Home 
prices plummeted an average of 33% between 2006 and 2011, far exceeding any 
other housing market decline in recorded American history.3 This caused 
homeowners nationwide to lose an aggregate of seven trillion dollars in home 
equity,4 nearly 50% of the total wealth tied up in homes in 2006.5 Little wonder then 
 
                                                 
* © 2016 Matthew J. Rossman. Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. I would like to thank Jonathan Adler, Brad Borden, Frank Conway, Thomas 
Fitzpatrick, Jessie Hill, Erik Jensen, Kermit Lind and David Reiss, all of whom provided 
very helpful feedback on an outline or draft of the article. I would also like to acknowledge 
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this article are entirely my own and should not be assumed to reflect the views of those who 
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1 1.4 Million U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2013 Down 26 Percent to 
Lowest Annual Total Since 2007, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-report/2013-year-end-us-foreclosure 
-report-7963 [https://perma.cc/4YKS-LZYN] (showing total U.S. foreclosure filings in 2006 
at approximately 717,000 increasing to approximately 2.9 million by 2010). 
2 Annamaria Andriotis et al., After Foreclosures, Home Buyers are Back, WALL STREET 
J. (Apr. 8, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/after-foreclosures-home-buyers-
are-back-1428538655 (on file with the Utah Law Review); Ben Beachy, A Financial Crisis 
Manual: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons of the Financial Crisis 4, 14–15 (Glob. Dev. 
& Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 12-06, 2012), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/12-
06BeachyFinancialCrisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/59GS-AMQM].  
3 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: 
CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 FEDERAL 
REPORT ON HOUSING MARKET], http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-
reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MWJ-HBT7]; see 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 13 fig.2.1 (2d ed. 2005) (displaying U.S. 
home prices, building costs, population, and interest rates from 1890 to 2004).  
4 Home equity means “[t]he value of ownership built up in a home or property that 
represents the current market value of the house less any remaining mortgage payments.” 
Home Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/home_equity.asp 
[https://perma.cc/ZQB5-YSKQ] (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
5 See Beachy, supra note 2, at 37. 
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that the Foreclosure Crisis and the larger and broader economic downturn it put into 
motion draw comparisons to the Great Depression.6 
Most recent reports on the U.S. housing market indicate that the country has 
largely recovered from the damage wrought by the Crisis. Average national home 
prices have rebounded (in some places to at or above pre-2006 levels),7 housing 
inventories have shrunk,8 and foreclosures continue to decrease steadily.9 These 
trends have contributed to a recapture of more than two-thirds of the aggregate 
homeowner equity lost by the peak of the Crisis.10 
Wide-lens statistics like these obscure a critical part of the story, however. A 
closer look reveals that the country is not composed of one or even fifty real estate 
markets, but rather thousands of smaller markets experiencing dramatically uneven 
levels of recovery.11 Home values in some markets have recovered little or none of 
their pre-Crisis peak, and in some cases are even still losing value.12 When examined 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT 
CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, at vi (2010) [hereinafter HUD REPORT ON 
FORECLOSURE CRISIS], http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/Foreclosure_09.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QXP2-XMY4]; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT, at xv (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION 
REPORT], http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
X544-2ZX8]. 
7 See S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index, S&P DOW JONES 
INDICES (Oct. 27, 2015), http://us.spindices.com/indices/real-estate/sp-case-shiller-20-city-
composite-home-price-index [http://perma.cc/UME2-2L4C] (showing home prices have 
risen steadily since the 2011 low point). 
8 DANIEL HARTLEY & KYLE FEE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, HOUSING 
RECOVERY: HOW FAR HAVE WE COME?, ECON. COMMENT. (2013) (citing to data from the 
National Association of Realtors showing recent declines in for-sale home inventory).  
9 See CORELOGIC, NATIONAL FORECLOSURE REPORT 2–4 (2015), 
http://www.corelogic.com/research/foreclosure-report/national-foreclosure-report-august-
2015-v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/T4B4-DDRH] (showing forty-six consecutive months of 
declining foreclosure inventory on a year-over-year basis and a national foreclosure rate that, 
while still more than double pre-crisis rate, has dropped steadily and returned to January 
2008 levels); see also 1.1 Million U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2014, Down 
18 Percent from 2013 to Lowest Level Since 2006, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.realtytrac.com/news/foreclosure-trends/1-1-million-u-s-properties-with-
foreclosure-filings-in-2014-down-18-percent-from-2013-to-lowest-level-since-2006/ 
[http://perma.cc/T97K-8SB6] (announcing that foreclosure filings in 2014 were at their 
lowest level since 2006). 
10 See generally HOUS. FIN. POLICY CTR., HOUSING FINANCE AT A GLANCE: A 
MONTHLY CHARTBOOK 6 (2015), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicat 
ion-pdfs/2000194-Housing-Finance-Chartbook-April-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ME8Z-
ZQTM] (showing that approximately $2.2 trillion in lost equity still remains). 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 SARAH BURD-SHARPS & REBECCA RASCH, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPACT 
OF THE US HOUSING CRISIS ON THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP ACROSS GENERATIONS 2 (2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/field_document/discrimlend_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PH4-
H5QW]. 
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carefully, it appears that these markets have suffered serious structural damage due 
to a downward spiral of rampant foreclosures, vacancies, and physical deterioration 
spurred or accelerated by the Crisis.13 Even more troubling is that these most heavily 
impacted housing markets are in communities (what this Article will refer to as the 
“Hardest Hit Communities”) that are typically composed predominantly of low- and 
middle-income residents, and are also disproportionately communities of color.14 
Because the home is much more likely to be the principal or only asset in these 
households,15 the Foreclosure Crisis has had a more severe, as well as a more 
enduring, impact on overall household wealth on those least able to afford it. There 
is little evidence to suggest that housing markets in most of the Hardest Hit 
Communities will recover more than marginally at any point in the near future.16 
Most efforts to ease the blow to U.S. homeowners caused by the Foreclosure 
Crisis have proposed fixes to what may be its most prominent and nefarious 
symbol—the “underwater mortgage.” An underwater mortgage is one in which the 
homeowner owes more on the mortgage than the home is worth,17 and it is both a 
cause and vestige of the Crisis that continues to afflict many American 
homeowners.18 The most dramatic and potentially impactful proposals have called 
for governmental involvement in reducing principal loan amounts on those 
                                                 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See id. 
15 See, e.g., Mauricio Soto, Family Net Worth Before the Recession, URBAN INST. (Mar. 
2010), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412078-Family-
Net-Worth-before-the-Recession.PDF [https://perma.cc/MUE6-P74V] (using Survey of 
Consumer Finances Data to show that home equity constitutes approximately 60% of net 
worth for families in the bottom quintile of U.S. income, approximately 47% for families in 
the middle quintile, and 22% for families in the highest quintile). Home ownership 
constitutes 92% of the net worth for African Americans and 67% for Latinos, compared with 
58% for whites. REBECCA TIPPETT ET AL., CTR. FOR GLOB. POLICY SOLS., BEYOND BROKE: 
WHY CLOSING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP IS A PRIORITY FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
SECURITY 4 (2014), http://globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Beyond_ 
Broke_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/MHF6-738Z]. 
16 There is even some concern that home prices in these communities will fall further 
as a wave of interest rate increases on home mortgages and equity lines kick in during 2015. 
See David Dayen, You Thought the Mortgage Crisis Was Over? It’s About to Flare Up 
Again, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119187/mort 
gage-foreclosures-2015-why-crisis-will-flare-again [http://perma.cc/4CJD-T3LB]; Dina 
ElBoghdady, The Foreclosure Crisis Is Still Burning Years After the Housing Crisis Ended, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2014/03/11/the-foreclosure-crisis-is-still-burning-years-after-the-housing-crisis-ended/ 
[http://perma.cc/Y93Q-PH69]. 
17 See 2012 FEDERAL REPORT ON HOUSING MARKET, supra note 3, at 4. 
18 See Svenja Gudell, Negative Equity Continues to Fall, Concentrated in Bottom Tier, 
ZILLOW (May 19, 2014), http://www.zillow.com/research/2014-q1-negative-equity-report-
6937/ [http://perma.cc/H5V4-L2ZF] (showing that as of the first quarter of 2014, 18.8% of 
U.S. homeowners with a mortgage had negative equity). 
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mortgages most at risk of default.19 Realigning the loan-to-value ratio on mortgages 
that are deeply underwater would, according to advocates, reduce the incidence of 
default, and thereby keep more homeowners in their homes, lessen the number of 
distressed foreclosure sales, and help “stuck” housing markets rebound.20  
Principal reduction strategies have, however, typically encountered strenuous 
public-policy objections centered primarily on the perception that they 
inappropriately bail out the types of irresponsible consumer borrowing and other 
behaviors that helped fuel the Foreclosure Crisis and interfere with market forces.21 
As a result, meaningful principal reduction has usually been a political and practical 
nonstarter. Government’s other, more modest, attempts to aid at risk borrowers have 
been tepid, piecemeal, and ineffective.22 More recently, the popular perception is 
that the Foreclosure Crisis is simply over, which has sapped any remaining political 
momentum to intervene.23  
Without disputing the merits of any further efforts to reverse the fortunes of 
distressed borrowers, this Article takes a decidedly different approach. Nearly a 
decade removed from the onset of the Crisis, it calls for taking stock of the 
permanent damage the Crisis caused. As this Article will illustrate, the evidence is 
clear that what homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities have experienced is 
not a temporary downturn in home prices, but rather a permanent transition to a 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain 
Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt, CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., no. 5, 2013, at 1, 
4 (suggesting that governments use their eminent domain power to purchase underwater 
mortgages); Jann Swanson, How a “Bad Bank” Could Help Clear the Mortgage and 
Housing Markets, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (July 16, 2012, 2:51 PM), 
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/07162012_principal_reduction.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
QYF5-4MLX] (reporting on Adam J. Levitin’s proposal to create a “bad 
bank . . . specifically for acquiring and restructuring troubled assets”). 
20 Id. 
21 Dan Immergluck, Too Little, Too Late, and Too Timid: The Federal Response to the 
Foreclosure Crisis at the Five-Year Mark, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 199, 218 (2013). 
Often these strategies are criticized for creating the moral hazard of incentivizing borrowers 
to fall behind on their mortgages in order to qualify for principal reduction. See Hockett, 
supra note 19, at 8. Others defer to the idea that the market is the most appropriate arbiter 
and that government-mandated principal reduction would interfere with the market resetting 
home values. See, e.g., Tim Cavanaugh, The ‘Foreclosure Crisis’ Has Ended, NAT’L REV. 
(Apr. 16, 2014, 7:01 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/375931/foreclosure-crisis-
has-ended-tim-cavanaugh [http://perma.cc/5QXC-J46U]; The Sanctification of 
Irresponsible Borrowers, REAL CLEAR MARKETS (Oct. 30, 2008), 
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2008/10/the_sanctification_of_irrespon.html 
[http://perma.cc/39WR-P8E9].  
22 See infra Part III. 
23 See, e.g., Ohio Blight-fighting Money Is in Jeopardy as Congress Eyes it for Highway 
Use Instead http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2015/07/ohio_blight-fighting_ 
money_is.html [https://perma.cc/NPL4-F9RV] (reporting effort by Senate committee to re-
direct Foreclosure Crisis Hardest Hit Funds to highway repair by contending that 
foreclosures have slowed and home prices have sufficiently rebounded).  
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lower value plateau.24 Moreover, this transition represents something other than just 
a healthy readjustment to real value in the wake of pre-Crisis home price run-ups, 
and instead reflects damage to the fundamentals of these housing markets brought 
on by rampant foreclosures. Given that this damage will be very difficult to 
overcome during the average tenure of a U.S. homeowner,25 the bottom line for 
homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities is that they have incurred “permanent” 
losses in the values of their homes and, by extension, in their household wealth.26 
The time is right to consider whether the law provides any remedy. 
Adjusting the focus in this way also brings to light that the Foreclosure Crisis 
wreaked financial havoc on many more than just those whose homes went into 
foreclosure. Across the country, a large majority of homeowners with underwater 
mortgages stayed current on their payments.27 Many others owned their homes 
outright28 or had already paid enough into their mortgages that declining home prices 
did not cause their homes to go underwater, making foreclosure a much less likely 
outcome. Within localized housing markets, home-value declines did not 
discriminate among those who defaulted on their mortgages and those who did not. 
Homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities who did not go into foreclosure 
suffered substantial collateral damage as repeated waves of foreclosures battered 
                                                 
24 See infra Part II. 
25 A recent study by the National Association of Home Builders, using data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s American Housing Bureau, estimates the average buyer of a single-
family home can be expected to stay in the home approximately thirteen years before moving 
out and that this has stayed roughly consistent over the past twenty-five years. See Paul 
Emrath, Latest Study Shows Average Buyer Expected to Stay in a Home 13 Years, NAHB® 
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://eyeonhousing.org/2013/01/latest-study-shows-average-buyer-
expected-to-stay-in-a-home-13-years/ [http://perma.cc/QBM2-8UCD]. However, median 
tenure is lower, with several recent studies showing nine years as the median tenure of a U.S. 
homeowner. See NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS®, 2014 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
REALTORS® HOME BUYER AND SELLER GENERATIONAL TRENDS exhibit 6-16 (2014), 
http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/reports/2014/2014-home-buyer-and-seller-
generational-trends-report-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8MC-9MST]; see also PETER 
MATEYKA & MATTHEW MARLAY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE DURATION AND TENURE OF 
RESIDENCE, 1996 TO 2009 (2012), https://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/files/2008-
Duration-WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/385G-Y6ZT]. 
26 As explained in Part II, “permanent” corresponds roughly to the length of time 
homeowners typically remain in their homes. This is not to say home prices in the Hardest 
Hit Communities will not recover in future years. But if a community’s home prices are 
impaired to the point that they show little prospect of meaningful recovery over a ten- to 
fifteen-year horizon, then this equates to a permanent loss of value for homeowners in this 
community. 
27 According to one study, 90% of homeowners with underwater mortgages stay current 
on their mortgages. Gudell, supra note 18.  
28 According to census data, more than one-third of homeowners do not have a 
mortgage. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2013 HOUSING PROFILE: UNITED STATES 2 tbl.2 (2015), 
http://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/2013/factsheets/ahs13-1_UnitedStates.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/H3YS-KVVL]. 
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their communities and destroyed the equity in their homes.29 To the extent that it 
matters, most of the public-policy objections raised to aiding distressed borrowers 
should not apply to this largely sympathetic and, to date, overlooked group of 
homeowners who stuck by their obligations, held fast in their communities, and 
simply had the misfortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time.  
Although comprehensive strategies aimed at repairing damage to home values 
in the Hardest Hit Communities certainly exist, the political climate for 
implementing them is daunting and they would, even if adopted, take years to make 
a substantial impact. So this Article turns instead to a mechanism that already exists 
under the Internal Revenue Code30 (“IRC”) that would simply allow homeowners in 
the Hardest Hit Communities to recognize their losses. Since its inception, the IRC 
has allowed taxpayers a deduction from taxable income for uninsured damages to 
their homes and other personal property due to a “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other 
casualty.”31 Known as the casualty-loss deduction, it is typically claimed by those 
whose property is damaged by natural calamities like hurricanes, earthquakes, and 
floods as well as others who incur similar losses as a result of a “sudden, unusual 
and unexpected force.”  
As this Article will explain, the Foreclosure Crisis stripped home values in the 
Hardest Hit Communities in a manner that was sudden, unexpected, and crippling. 
It was set into motion by a complex web of activity unknown to and uncontrollable 
by most of those homeowners who suffered the greatest losses from it. In these 
respects, the resemblance to casualty losses is striking. Accordingly, this Article 
argues that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and, by extension, the U.S. 
Treasury Department should recognize the permanent damage to home values in the 
Hardest Hit Communities as casualty losses.32  
This Article contends that this should be the case notwithstanding the historic 
stance taken by the IRS and most courts that limits the deduction to only those 
taxpayers whose property has incurred physical damage. A careful reading of the 
law reveals that this distinction is not required; a careful consideration of the 
normative rationales justifying the deduction reveals that the distinction is arbitrary 
and inequitable.33 Moreover, as this Article will explain, Congress has already 
extended conceptually similar tax relief to those homeowners who agreed to 
mortgage principal reductions with their lenders or defaulted on their mortgages 
during the Foreclosure Crisis and had some of their mortgage debt released upon 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., Foreclosures Continue: What Needs to Change in the Administration’s 
Response: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight 
& Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 191 (2010) (statement of Julia Gordon, Center for Responsible 
Lending) (“Tens of millions of households where the owners have paid their mortgages on 
time every month are suffering a decrease in their property values that amounts to hundreds 
of billions of dollars in lost wealth just because they are located near property in 
foreclosure.”). 
30 26 U.S.C. §§ 1–9834 (2012). 
31 Id. § 165(c)(3). 
32 See infra Part V. 
33 See infra Part V. 
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reconveyance.34 Allowing these taxpayers to reduce their tax base by amounts 
equatable to their damaged home values, but not those who incurred similar damage 
but did not receive any break on their mortgage obligations, is likewise inequitable. 
Notwithstanding its conceptual fit, the casualty-loss deduction poses 
challenging valuation, timing, and qualification issues in its application to the 
Foreclosure Crisis which could make it difficult to administer and almost certainly 
fuel IRS resistance to recognizing it. Moreover, as currently written, the deduction’s 
value is largely muted for low- and middle-income taxpayers, in part due to the 
floors Congress has imposed on it over time. This Article examines each of these 
challenges in turn and explains their implications for an effective and equitable 
implementation of the deduction in this instance.35 The Article then proposes 
modifications to the deduction that the federal government could consider making 
to address these concerns.36 The starting point is to recognize the conceptual and 
equitable justifications for considering the type of damage to home values that 
occurred in the Hardest Hit Communities as properly deductible casualty losses and 
to proceed from there in fashioning potential modifications. 
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II explains briefly how the 
Foreclosure Crisis unfolded, its disparate impact among localized housing markets, 
and how in the Hardest Hit Communities the result was severe and entrenched 
reductions in home values tantamount to permanent damage. Part III summarizes 
the federal government’s various responses to the Crisis, demonstrating that by and 
large these efforts have done little to address this damage. Part IV explains how the 
IRC treats a taxpayer’s personal losses and why it typically does not allow a taxpayer 
whose primary residence has declined in value to deduct this from her taxable 
income. Part V explores the primary exception to this rule—the casualty-loss 
deduction—and makes the case for why it ought to apply to homeowners in the 
Hardest Hit Communities. Parts VI and VII identify the administrative and 
distributional challenges to utilizing the deduction in this context. Part VIII sets forth 
two possible modifications to the deduction to address these challenges and the 
merits of adopting one or both of these proposals.  
 
II.  THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND ITS DISPARATE IMPACT ON HOME VALUES 
 
A.  The Foreclosure Crisis 
 
The circumstances leading to the Foreclosure Crisis can best be likened to a 
brewing storm that escaped attention while it gathered strength, but once it rolled in 
was too furious to escape. Several years of increasingly risky mortgage lending and 
borrowing practices were fueled by a volatile and complex mix of rising home 
prices, low interest rates, lax governmental regulation of the mortgage finance 
industry, a corresponding loosening of underwriting requirements, a huge influx of 
                                                 
34 See infra Part III. 
35 See infra Parts VI, VII.  
36 See infra Part VIII. 
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additional lending capital due to the growth of the international mortgage-backed 
securities market, inaccurate risk assessments of these securities by credit-rating 
agencies, and, to some extent, fraud.37 Lenders driven by the quest for profits and 
borrowers lured by previously unavailable avenues for financing home purchases 
and other expenses (by leveraging existing equity in their homes) cooperated to 
flood the market with large numbers of subprime mortgages that carried a high risk 
of default.38 Meanwhile, the home construction industry matched homebuyers’ 
enthusiasm for newly built homes with waves of new construction.39 Inflated home 
prices, easy capital, and oversupply finally came to a head in late 2006, ending the 
growth in home prices and reversing course. As home prices began to fall, subprime 
borrowers could no longer sell or refinance their homes to pay off unaffordable 
mortgages, and they began to default in increasing numbers.40 As defaults mounted, 
banks heavily invested in subprime mortgages began to fail, causing huge losses on 
the securities markets, which had invested trillions of dollars into these mortgages.41 
Mortgage industry exuberance built on the unrealistic expectation that home prices 
would continue to appreciate at a record pace turned quickly to despair as the storm 
clouds rolled in.42 
But it gets worse. The collapse of the U.S. mortgage market quickly spurred 
similar collapses in other parts of the world and together put into motion a global 
financial crisis. Financial institutions failed, credit markets seized up, the stock 
market plummeted, companies shut down or laid off workers, and the economy 
plunged into a deep recession.43 
Exacerbated by the larger economic freefall that it sparked, the Foreclosure 
Crisis dealt a sudden and severe blow to the U.S. housing market. Mortgage defaults 
quickly led to foreclosures.44 The resulting flood of “distressed” property sales (i.e., 
sales made in the course of or in anticipation of foreclosure) further depressed 
prices.45 As more properties went underwater (ensuring most potential home sellers 
                                                 
37 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at xv–xxviii. 
38 Id. 
39 Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble and the Financial Crisis, 46 REAL-WORLD ECON. 
REV. 73, 74 (2008). 
40 Id. at 79. 
41 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at xvi, 27.  
42 HUD REPORT ON FORECLOSURE CRISIS, supra note 6, at 38.  
43 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at xvi. 
44 HUD REPORT ON FORECLOSURE CRISIS, supra note 6, at 2–3; see HOUS. FIN. POLICY 
CTR., supra note 10, at 18. 
45 See Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, IV, The Impact of Vacant, Tax-
Delinquent, and Foreclosed Property on Sales Prices of Neighboring Homes 35–36 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 11-23R, 2012) (concluding that distressed 
properties lower the sales prices of neighboring properties). In some places, distressed sales 
went from a minuscule percentage of overall property sales to a majority of sales within a 
matter of months. Mark M. Fleming, Chief Economist, CoreLogic, Statement before the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 5 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0923-Fleming.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
GG7F-6HXK]. 
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would sell at a loss) and the national unemployment rate doubled,46 demand for real 
estate dried up and inventories of unsold homes doubled.47 Average national home 
prices fell by 33%, causing a 50% loss in aggregate homeowner equity.48 The 
housing market was in full-fledged crisis.  
 
B.  Disparate Onset, Disparate Recovery 
 
Although national statistics are useful in grasping the aggregate impact of the 
Foreclosure Crisis, they obscure a critical reality. That is, the Crisis did not affect all 
areas of the country uniformly. To the contrary, certain areas fared much worse than 
others and much worse than the national statistics suggest.  
This disparity can be seen first in the onset of the Crisis. For example, the “sand 
states” (Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada) experienced much larger than 
average run-ups in home prices leading up to the Crisis, an average foreclosure rate 
during the acute phase of the Crisis of more than twice the national rate,49 and a 
nearly 50% freefall in average home prices by the end of 2008.50 In sharp contrast, 
the Foreclosure Crisis largely bypassed the less populated Upper Plain states (North 
and South Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming) and Alaska. These states did experience 
relatively large pre-Crisis home price increases.51 However, foreclosure rates in the 
Upper Plains never exceeded the historic norm, and housing markets did not 
experience home price declines.52 Industrial Midwestern states saw relatively 
modest, pre-Crisis home price increases, but these were followed by relatively high 
foreclosure rates and significant price declines.53 
Finer-grained examinations that distinguish the impact of the Crisis on different 
cities within the same state and on different zip codes within the same metropolitan 
area often show similar variations within these much smaller geographic areas.54 It 
was not uncommon for adjoining and nearby communities to experience radically 
different rates of home-value declines. For example, in Cleveland’s Slavic Village, 
                                                 
46 The national unemployment rate was 5% in April 2008 and doubled to 10% by 
October 2009. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [http://perma.cc/MQV2-E2CU] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
47 HARTLEY & FEE, supra note 8.  
48 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
49 HUD REPORT ON FORECLOSURE CRISIS, supra note 6, at 10. 
50 Id. at 14. 
51 Id. at 12, 14. 
52 Id. at 13–14. 
53 Id. 
54 LAURA CHOI, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., HOUSING MARKET RECOVERY IN THE 
12TH DISTRICT: IMPLICATIONS FOR LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME COMMUNITIES 2–4 
(2013) (showing significant variation in foreclosure rates, home price declines, and negative 
equity rates as a result of the Foreclosure Crisis between various metropolitan regions within 
California); Fleming, supra note 45, at 13 (detailing dramatic differences in home price 
declines by zip code within the Sacramento, California metropolitan area). 
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the neighborhood originally deemed the epicenter of the Foreclosure Crisis, home 
values declined 54%;55 but just two zip codes away in the affluent Cleveland suburb 
of Chagrin Falls, home values barely fell.56 
By most indicators, the acute phase of the Foreclosure Crisis concluded toward 
the end of 2011, as housing markets bottomed out and then began to trend upward.57 
National price indices reflect a fairly steady recovery that has brought home prices 
to just under 10% of their pre-Crisis peak,58 restored more than two-thirds of lost 
homeowner equity,59 and significantly reduced the percentage of homeowners with 
underwater mortgages nationally to somewhere in the low teens.60 However, a closer 
look reveals that the pace and degree of recovery also varies significantly among 
more localized housing markets.61 Average home prices in eight states have fully 
recovered and actually increased, in some cases robustly, above their pre-
Foreclosure Crisis peak.62 Meanwhile, in Nevada and Florida home values remain 
at or close to one-third below their peak (the national average during the worst days 
of the Crisis).63 
As with the onset data, finer-grained recovery data often reveals dramatic 
differences within much smaller geographic areas. Home values in Slavic Village 
remain stuck at their Foreclosure Crisis low point (54% below peak), while in 
Chagrin Falls homes have recovered their modest losses and gained nearly 10% on 
                                                 
55 44105 Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.zillow.com/cleveland-oh-44105/home-values (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).  
56 Chagrin Falls Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.zillow.com/chagrin-falls-oh/home-values (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (showing 
a pattern of relatively quick decreases and increases to home values, the median home value 
never dropped below 7% of the pre-Crisis peak, and the median home value sometimes 
exceeded the pre-Crisis peak).  
57 HARTLEY & FEE, supra note 8. 
58 CORELOGIC, HOME PRICE INDEX REPORT 3 (2015), https://www.corelogic.com/ 
research/hpi/corelogic_hpi_april_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/28UG-4XYJ]; S&P/Case-
Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index, supra note 7. 
59 See HOUS. FIN. POLICY CTR., supra note 10, at 6–9. 
60 Id. at 18 (showing residential properties in negative equity as a share of all residential 
properties with a mortgage at 10.8% in the last quarter of 2014). But see Svenja Gudell, Q1 
2015 Negative Equity Report: After Three Long Years, the Hard Work Begins Now, ZILLOW 
(June 11, 2015), http://www.zillow.com/research/negative-equity-2015-q1-9905/ 
[http://perma.cc/J2D9-Z4WF] (showing the negative equity rate for the first quarter of 2015 
at 15.4%).  
61 CORELOGIC, supra note 58, at 7. A comparison of the country’s largest greater 
metropolitan areas shows a similar level of disparity. See S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City 
Composite Home Price Index, supra note 7 (examining individual city indices shows full 
recovery and robust subsequent appreciation of prices in Dallas and Denver, as contrasted 
with only modest recapture of Foreclosure Crisis price declines in, for example, Chicago, 
Cleveland, and New York). 
62 CORELOGIC, supra note 58, at 7. 
63 Id. 
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their pre-Crisis peak.64 A Wall Street Journal map published in July 2015 
demonstrates that this is not a local phenomenon.65 The map reveals pockets of very 
high rates of negative equity, a direct outgrowth of depressed home prices, that are 
much higher than those in nearby zip codes (sometimes three or four times higher) 
within many major metropolitan areas.66 In a similar vein, a 2014 report published 
by the Haas Institute at the University of California, Berkeley found 395 zip codes 
spread across the United States in which the percentage of homes still underwater 
ranged from 43% to 76% and in which home price appreciation since the low point 
of the Foreclosure Crisis was either negligible or where prices had fallen even 
further.67 The bottom line is that not only has the recovery from the Foreclosure 
Crisis not been uniformly felt, but that there are certain neighborhoods and cities 
where there has been essentially no recovery at all. 
The trajectories of three adjacent housing markets in one metropolitan region—
Hartford, Connecticut—demonstrate this point in particularly dramatic fashion and 
provide some indication of why this happened. As was common throughout the 
United States, the entire greater Hartford region experienced healthy home price 
gains in the lead-up to the Foreclosure Crisis.68 Starting in early 2008, home prices 
in the city of Hartford dropped dramatically, with the median home value declining 
approximately 33% from $134,000 to $91,000 by the time the national housing 
market began to recover.69 Contrary to national housing market trends, however, 
median value in Hartford has, subject to some minor and temporary fluctuations, 
remained stuck at its post-Crisis low point.70 Someone who bought the median value 
Hartford home in 2008 and sold it today at market value would receive 
approximately $43,000 less than what she paid for it. 
                                                 
64 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. See also Frank Ford, Is the Cuyahoga 
County Foreclosure Crisis Over? It Depends on Where You’re Standing, 
http://www.wrlandconservancy.org/articles/2016/03/18/is-the-cuyahoga-county-foreclosure 
-crisis-over/ [https://perma.cc/MD2A-5V2X]. 
65 Martin Burch et al., Housing Prices Still Falling for Working-Class Families, WALL 
STREET J. (June 23, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/underwater-homes/ [http://perma.cc/ 
NM6R-B6KC]. 
66 Id. 
67 PETER DREIER ET AL., HAAS INST. FOR A FAIR & INCLUSIVE SOC’Y, UNDERWATER 
AMERICA: HOW THE SO-CALLED HOUSING “RECOVERY” IS BYPASSING MANY AMERICAN 
COMMUNITIES 6 (2014) [hereinafter HAAS REPORT],  http://diversity.berkeley.edu/sites/ 
default/files/HaasInsitute_UnderwaterAmerica_PUBLISH_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/8U6J-
7KMH]. Of the 395 zip codes identified as the hardest hit, average home price declines since 
2006 were greater or equal to 33% in 82% of the zip codes for which data was available. Id. 
68 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Gosselin, Home Building Remains Sturdy in State, HARTFORD 
COURANT (June 26, 2004), http://articles.courant.com/2004-06-26/business/0406260172_1 
_new-home-sales-home-buyer-interest-permits [http://perma.cc/5QEJ-JFX9] (indicating 
that Hartford County was among the state’s leaders in new building permits and linking 
demand for new housing with continuing home price increases).  
69 Hartford Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.zillow.com/hartford-ct/home-values/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
70 Id. 
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A similar pattern occurred in one of Hartford’s immediately adjacent inner-ring 
suburbs, East Hartford. The median home value in East Hartford also fell 
dramatically from a pre-Crisis peak of $194,000 in 2007 to $142,000 in December 
2014 (approximately 26%), where it has essentially flatlined.71 
Immediately to the west of Hartford is another inner-ring suburb, West 
Hartford. Its median home value fell approximately the same dollar amount as the 
city of Hartford’s during the Crisis, although this decline represented only a 10% 
reduction due to West Hartford’s considerably higher home values.72 Moreover, 
West Hartford’s housing market rebounded strongly starting in 2012 and its median 
home value is within approximately 4% of its pre-Crisis peak.73 Drilling one level 
deeper, in West Hartford’s westernmost zip code, the housing market has fully 
recovered, meaning that homeowners will at least break even upon resale and might 
even walk away with a profit.74  
So what explains the differences? It is worth noting that, although these cities 
are adjoining, they are worlds apart in demographics. Median household income is 
$28,931 in Hartford,75 $48,438 in East Hartford,76 and $81,588 in West Hartford.77 
In other words, one city is poor, one is middle income, and one is affluent. The cities 
are also quite different in racial composition: Hartford is predominantly African 
American and Hispanic, East Hartford is racially mixed, and West Hartford is 
predominantly white.78 These facts are noteworthy because, in many cases, a 
community’s median income and racial composition are useful indicators of how 
acutely it was impacted by the Foreclosure Crisis and how well it is recovering.79 
                                                 
71 East Hartford Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.zillow.com/east-hartford-ct/home-values/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (showing 
the value of a median home at $143,900 as of November 2015).  
72 West Hartford Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.zillow.com/west-hartford-ct/home-values/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).  
73 Id. 
74 06107 Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.zillow.com/west-hartford-ct-06107/home-values/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
75 CERC, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT: CERC TOWN PROFILE 2014, at 1 (2014) 
[hereinafter HARTFORD PROFILE], https://www.cerc.com/TownProfiles/Customer-
Images/hartford.pdf [https://perma.cc/UK9M-NEWZ]. 
76 CERC, EAST HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT: CERC TOWN PROFILE 2014, at 1 (2014) 
[hereinafter EAST HARTFORD PROFILE], https://www.cerc.com/TownProfiles/Customer-
Images/easthartford.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA2N-67PQ]. 
77 CERC, WEST HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT: CERC TOWN PROFILE 2014, at 1 (2014) 
[hereinafter WEST HARTFORD PROFILE], https://www.cerc.com/TownProfiles/Customer-
Images/westhartford.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VE2-536L]. 
78 HARTFORD PROFILE, supra note 75, at 1; EAST HARTFORD PROFILE, supra note 76, 
at 1; WEST HARTFORD PROFILE, supra note 77, at 1. 
79 These factors are less determinative in explaining which areas in the sand states 
experienced home-value declines, as the Foreclosure Crisis affected these states more 
uniformly. However, recovery of home values, as reflected by zip code negative equity rates, 
has generally speaking been more robust in higher-median-income zip codes in the sand 
states than in lower-median-income zip codes. See Burch et al., supra note 65. 
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Communities that are not recovering from the Crisis are much more likely to be 
middle to low income80 and racially mixed or communities of color.81 
Why is this? Like the answers to most questions relating to the Foreclosure 
Crisis, the answer here is multifaceted and a bit complex. An important piece is the 
impact of subprime lending. Home price declines tended to be worst among those 
communities most heavily targeted by subprime lenders in the years preceding the 
Crisis.82 Subprime lending proliferated in low- and middle-income communities 
between 2002 and 2005. Mortgage lenders, flush with additional lending capital 
supplied by the asset securitization markets, sought out new waves of untapped 
borrowers but utilized subprime mortgages with higher interest rates to cover the 
higher risk of default associated with borrowers with weaker credit histories, lower 
income, and smaller down payments.83 This type of lending also proliferated in 
certain fast-growing areas with considerable new construction (in particular, in the 
sand states).84  
The more aggressive subprime terms proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy in 
that they left these borrowers more vulnerable to mortgage default when economic 
circumstances worsened.85 Communities with larger shares of subprime borrowers 
                                                 
80 Eighty-eight percent of cities with more than 100,000 residents and listed in the Haas 
Report as the one hundred cities hit hardest by the Foreclosure Crisis have a poverty rate 
greater than the national poverty rate of 14.5%. HAAS REPORT, supra note 67, at 6. The 
negative equity rate among “low value” homes (those in the bottom one-third tier) remains 
three times that among “high value” homes (those in the top one-third tier). Gudell, supra 
note 60. 
81 The Haas Report notes that “[i]n 64% of the 395 hardest-hit ZIP codes, African 
Americans and Latinos accounted for at least half of the population,” HAAS REPORT, supra 
note 67, at 4, while they represent just 28.9% of the national population, according to 2010 
Census data. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/ 
PST045215/00 [https://perma.cc/HP96-569F] (last visited Jan. 28, 2016); see also JOINT 
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 31–32 
(2014) (asserting that price drops as a result of the Foreclosure Crisis were three times greater 
in minority neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods).  
82 Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence 
from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis 1–2 (Dec. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1072304 [http://perma.cc/Z927-
WZ9F]; see Beachy, supra note 2, at 19–20 (citing favorably to the Mian and Sufi study in 
concluding that subprime lending played an important role in causing the Foreclosure Crisis 
and subprime defaults emanated from zip codes with a higher proportion of subprime 
borrowing); see also HUD REPORT ON FORECLOSURE CRISIS, supra note 6, at 12 (stating that 
two factors stood out in differentiating states hit hardest by the Foreclosure Crisis—higher 
shares of high-cost loans and larger home price increases in the years preceding the 
Foreclosure Crisis). 
83 Beachy, supra note 2, at 20; see Paul S. Calem et al., The Neighborhood Distribution 
of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 404–07 (2004). 
84 Chris Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom? 11 
(Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2008-29, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
feds/2008/200829/200829pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YTY-YRAT]. 
85 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the 
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had mortgage default rates more than three times larger than those in “prime” zip 
codes in the same metropolitan areas during the first two years of the Foreclosure 
Crisis.86 Numerous studies have demonstrated that each foreclosure has a negative 
spillover effect on the property values of neighboring properties,87 and that this 
effect can be heightened when foreclosures are highly concentrated88 and occur 
during housing downturns.89 Thus it stands to reason that those cities and zip codes 
pounded early by subprime defaults and foreclosures experienced large home price 
declines, pushing more mortgages underwater and creating the environment for 
additional waves of foreclosures and greater price instability.  
This phenomenon also has a racial component. Studies of lending-industry data 
show that African American and Latino borrowers were much more likely than 
white borrowers of the same risk profile (i.e., credit score, income level, etc.) to be 
approved for and steered toward a subprime mortgage instead of a more affordable 
traditional mortgage.90 Moreover, among mortgages that went into default, lenders 
foreclosed on the homes of African American and Latino borrowers at a rate nearly 
double that for white borrowers at the same income level.91 Recognizing, as the 
previous paragraph does, that subprime mortgages are more likely to lead to 
                                                 
Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 32 (2006) (citing 
evidence that as a general matter the propensity of borrowers of subprime loans to default is 
much higher than for borrowers of prime loans). 
86 Mian & Sufi, supra note 82, at 1. 
87 DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, PETER SMITH, & WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE SPILLOVER COSTS OF FORECLOSURES 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter THE SPILLOVER COSTS OF FORECLOSURES], http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
mortgage-lending/research-analysis/collateral-damage.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCR8-CE7Y] 
(estimating that residents who lived in close proximity to foreclosures lost $1.95 trillion in 
property value during the first four years of the Foreclosure Crisis due to the “spillover” cost 
of a foreclosed property); see also Elliot Anenberg & Edward Kung, Estimates of the Size 
and Source of Price Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2527, 2527 
(2014) (providing “new evidence that foreclosures have a causal effect on nearby house 
prices”); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact 
of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
57, 58 (2006) (suggesting that foreclosures “can have implications for surrounding 
neighborhoods and for larger communities”).  
88 John P. Harding, Eric Rosenblatt, & Vincent W. Yao, The Contagion Effect of 
Foreclosed Properties, 66 J. URB. ECON. 164, 164 (2009). 
89 Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt, & Vincent W. Yao, Spillover Effects of Foreclosures 
on Neighborhood Property Values, 38 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 387, 388–89 (2009). 
90 DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, WEI LI, & KEITH S. ERNST, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE 
LENDING, FORECLOSURES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A CRISIS 6 
(2010), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosure 
s-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4NV-P3T6]; see also MONIQUE W. MORRIS, 
DISCRIMINATION AND MORTGAGE LENDING IN AMERICA: A SUMMARY OF THE DISPARATE 
IMPACT OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING ON AFRICAN AMERICANS, NAACP (2009), 
http://action.naacp.org/page/-/resources/Lending_Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9 
BU-35RZ]; Mayer & Pence, supra note 84, at 12–14; Calem et al., supra note 83, at 407. 
91 BOCIAN, LI, & ERNST, supra note 90, at 2. 
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foreclosures than traditional mortgages and that foreclosures force down a 
community’s home prices, these discriminatory lending practices help to explain 
why price drops in predominantly minority neighborhoods during the Foreclosure 
Crisis were significantly greater than price drops in predominantly white 
neighborhoods.92 
Another part of the answer involves the differences in vulnerability among 
localized housing markets to a sudden and massive price shock. Using fundamental 
principles of supply and demand, one might posit that communities in which home 
values decreased the most during the Foreclosure Crisis would be best poised for 
recovery as demand for housing recovers. Indeed this bears out in some areas of the 
country.93  
Other, lower growth markets, however, have proven to be highly inelastic and 
much less resilient to the severe blow dealt to them by the Foreclosure Crisis. 
Unanticipated waves of foreclosures swept through these communities, creating 
large inventories of vacant and abandoned properties, sucking the vitality out of 
them, and making it difficult to attract new residents and businesses.94 Especially in 
less affluent areas, where local governments were poorer and banks less motivated 
to invest in protecting properties in foreclosure, property vacancy accelerated rates 
of tax delinquency, deterioration, vandalism, and crime, which placed further 
downward pressure on neighboring home values.95 Large volumes of foreclosure-
induced, distressed home sales led to an oversupply on the housing market and the 
creation of shadow inventories of homes ready to flood markets whenever prices 
showed signs of recovery.96 In turn, entrenched lower home values further reduced 
                                                 
92 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 81, at 31–32 
(asserting that price drops as a result of the Foreclosure Crisis were three times greater in 
minority neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods); Michael Fletcher, A Shattered 
Foundation: African Americans Who Bought Homes in Prince George’s Have Watched 
Their Wealth Vanish, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/01/24/the-american-dream-shatters-
in-prince-georges-county/ [http://perma.cc/99S5-YGHF] (comparing “housing values in two 
suburban Washington Zip codes” and finding that in the predominantly black community 
housing prices have not recovered any of the nearly 50% in lost value, while in the 
predominantly white community housing prices have recouped two-thirds of lost value). 
93 See CHOI, supra note 54, at 6 (“Low prices and increased demand for rental properties 
drew investors to purchase single family homes in markets across the country, particularly 
in areas with high concentrations of distressed properties,” in turn leading to rising home 
prices and a rapidly shrinking supply of distressed properties “particularly in hot markets 
around the country.”). 
94 See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, All Boarded Up, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/magazine/08Foreclosure-t.html?_r=0 [https://perma. 
cc/GH7D-SKTG] (describing the toll of these foreclosures on Cleveland, Ohio). 
95 Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 3; Press Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. All., 
U.S. Bank Accused of Racial Discrimination in Five More Cities (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/2014-11-18%20US%20Bank%20news%20 
release.PDF [http://perma.cc/M48R-BC4B]. 
96 STEPHAN WHITAKER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, FORECLOSURE RELATED 
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the local property tax base necessary to fund community services,97 caused banks to 
stop lending to potential buyers in these neighborhoods, and made current 
homeowners skittish about investing in improvements to their homes. These 
conditions acted in concert with such speed and force that they crippled home prices 
in these communities, causing their housing markets to break rather than bend. In 
this way, the Foreclosure Crisis acted as much more than a market correction, as 
some have contended, in which hyperinflated home prices simply reset to reflect 
their true pre-Crisis value.98 The Crisis inflicted its own casualties manifested in 
actual physical damage to homes and neighborhoods beset by foreclosures, as well 
as underlying harm to the fundamental functioning of certain housing markets.   
Nearly a decade removed from the onset of the Foreclosure Crisis, localized 
housing market statistics speak loud and clear. Some communities were not 
impacted by the Crisis; many others were impacted but have recovered or are 
recovering. This Article is concerned with housing markets that have not recovered 
and in which there appear to be no prospects for a meaningful recovery in the 
foreseeable future.  
Home values in these communities may decline further or flatline. Or they may 
begin to improve marginally. It is also possible that, with the right combination of 
sound redevelopment policies, infusions of public or private sector investment, and 
beneficial external market forces, a more significant increase in values may occur at 
some point down the road. But all indicators suggest that whatever increases or 
decreases in home values occur will take place from a new, dramatically lower, 
normal. It is this transition to a lower value plateau that is the hallmark of the Hardest 
Hit Communities.  
Moreover, at this point, the transition should be considered “permanent.” 
Admittedly, this is a difficult term to apply when it comes to property values. But if 
the objective is an assessment of homeowner losses, then it is useful to look through 
the eyes of a homeowner. The tenure of a typical U.S. homeowner historically and 
at present is somewhere between nine and thirteen years.99 With the ten-year mark 
of the onset of the Foreclosure Crisis looming, it is increasingly certain that 
homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities who purchased in the years prior to 
the Crisis or before it fully manifested will not recoup declines in the values of their 
homes in any meaningful way within that period of time when they might reasonably  
 
                                                 
VACANCY RATES, ECON. COMMENT. (2011). 
97 See, e.g., James Alm, Robert D. Buschman, & David L. Sjoquist, How Do 
Foreclosures Affect Property Values and Property Taxes?, LAND LINES, Jan. 2014, at 22, 
27–28 (describing this process in Georgia). 
98 See, e.g., Nicole Gelinas, Opinion, A Free-Market Fix to the Nation’s Housing 
Hangover, L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/31/opinion/la-
oe-gelinas-foreclosure-california-20110731 [http://perma.cc/9MRZ-4LNQ] (expressing that 
the market itself will fix housing prices in California); The Sanctification of Irresponsible 
Borrowers, supra note 21 (offering several reasons why the federal government should not 
intervene to save the housing market). 
99 Emrath, supra note 25. 
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be expected to own them. It is in this sense the damage to their home values is rightly 
considered permanent.  
 
III.  AMELIORATIVE RESPONSES TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
 
Given the scale and scope of the Foreclosure Crisis and the federal 
government’s oversight of the banking and housing sectors, most of the 
comprehensive responses to the Crisis aimed at easing the blow to U.S. homeowners 
and communities have come from the federal government. Although successful in 
tackling certain aspects of the Crisis, a brief look at these efforts shows they have 
largely overlooked the problem of permanent damage to home values in the Hardest 
Hit Communities. 
 
A.  Types of Responses 
 
The primary ameliorative responses to date can be grouped into four categories 
based on their objectives: (i) market stabilization, (ii) foreclosure prevention 
(including principal reduction), (iii) community stabilization, and (iv) tax relief. The 
first category is market stabilization. In the darkest days of the Crisis, the Bush and 
Obama administrations, working together with Congress, intervened aggressively 
with several large-scale maneuvers meant to stabilize the country’s financial and 
housing sectors and prevent a total economic collapse.100 With congressional 
authorization, the U.S. Treasury Department spent hundreds of billions of federal 
dollars shoring up government-sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.101 It also made equity purchases in several of the country’s largest banks, which 
were heavily invested in subprime mortgages but deemed too big to fail.102 The 
Federal Reserve Board spent another $1.25 trillion to purchase faltering mortgage-
backed securities in order to keep interest rates low and housing capital flowing.103 
In 2007, Congress approved homebuyer tax credits, which stayed in place in 
modified forms through 2010, with the objective of providing a spark to the frozen 
national housing market.104 Taken together, these measures helped quell the chaos 
                                                 
100 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FIVE YEARS LATER: 
RESPONSE, REFORM, AND PROGRESS 1 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/ 
Documents/FinancialCrisis5Yr_vFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6BD-JQ9J]. 
101 FHFA as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FED. HOUSING FIN. 
AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-
Conservatorships.aspx [http://perma.cc/L96D-SELC] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015); see 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1117, 122 Stat. 2654, 
2683–88 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (authorizing the U.S. 
Treasury to purchase obligations held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
102 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765, §§ 101–125, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767–93 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 
and 26 U.S.C.) (implementing the Troubled Asset Relief Program). 
103 Immergluck, supra note 21, at 205. 
104 The first-time homebuyer credit was implemented under the Housing and Economic 
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in the financial sector and kept the national housing market from total collapse. This 
had a positive spillover effect on everyone involved—investors, lenders, mortgage 
servicers, and homeowners.  
The second category is foreclosure prevention (including principal reduction). 
Congress authorized the Treasury Department to implement several programs aimed 
at stemming the tide of foreclosures, grouped under the Department’s Making Home 
Affordable (“MHA”) initiatives.105 Taken together, the MHA initiatives (i) provided 
inducements to lenders and loan servicers to ease mortgage loan terms, reduce 
mortgage principals, and sign off on short sales for at risk borrowers, (ii) allowed 
underwater borrowers to refinance their mortgages at lower interest rates, and (iii) 
in certain cases, gave short-term financial assistance to borrowers behind on their 
mortgages due to unemployment or other financial duress.106 For the most part, 
lenders balked at the notion of taking the more dramatic and impactful step of 
reducing what a borrower owed under his or her mortgage. Instead, a large majority 
of those helped under MHA programs merely refinanced their mortgages at lower 
interest rates or spread out mortgage payments over a longer horizon.107  
To some extent, the government learned from MHA’s design flaw of expecting 
lenders to voluntarily agree to lower principals. In its more recent settlements of 
several consumer and securities fraud lawsuits against the country’s largest banks 
and mortgage servicers arising out of the Foreclosure Crisis, the federal government 
has required that a portion of the settlement amounts go toward principal 
reduction.108 Still, critics have pointed to the flexibility banks have in complying 
                                                 
Recovery Act of 2008. § 3011, 122 Stat. at 2888–92 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36 
(2012)). It was later amended and extended by the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1006, 123 Stat. 115, 316–17, and the Worker, 
Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-92, § 11, 123 Stat. 
2984, 2989–91. 
105 See generally Cong. Oversight Panel, March Oversight Report, The Final Report of 
the Congressional Oversight Panel (2011).  
106 Id.  
107 See HOUS. FIN. POLICY CTR., supra note 10, at 27 (showing quarterly statistics on 
MHA loan modification activity, evidencing that on a quarter-by-quarter basis interest rate 
reductions, interest capitalizations, and term extensions make up the strong majority of 
modifications). 
108 PHILIP A. LEHMAN, N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
MULTISTATE/FEDERAL SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS 2, 
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/NMS_Executive_Summary-7-23-2012.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/239L-GKAN] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) (providing that the country’s five largest 
servicers provide up to $10.2 billion in mortgage principal reduction to borrowers who are 
in default or at risk of default). The U.S. Department of Justice took a similar tack when 
settling three cases against the nation’s largest banks related to their marketing and selling 
of mortgage-based securities. In total, the settlements allocated approximately $13 billion 
for “consumer relief,” including principal reduction on underwater mortgages. Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion 
Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing 
Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
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with the settlement agreements and the risk that they will use this to avoid 
meaningful principal reduction.109 Other commentators have proposed a variety of 
creative approaches for overcoming lenders’ resistance to principal reduction, but 
none of these proposals has taken hold on a widespread basis.110 
The third category is community stabilization. To a limited extent, the federal 
government has sought to address the negative spillover effects on cities and 
neighborhoods of abandoned and vacant properties left in the wake of the 
Foreclosure Crisis. Its principal effort in this regard was a temporary enhancement 
to the Federal Community Development Block Grant program called the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (“NSP”), targeted at neighborhoods most 
negatively impacted by the Crisis.111 The NSP rolled out in three rounds of funding 
to selected state and local governments and nonprofit organizations for projects 
involving the strategic acquisition and redevelopment or demolition of foreclosed 
and abandoned properties.112 Altogether, Congress authorized $7.3 billion in 
allocations for the NSP before the political will for continued funding waned in 
2010.113 Ultimately, this proved to be only a drop in the bucket given the massive 
damage caused by the Foreclosure Crisis.114 As the design of the NSP anticipated, 
                                                 
federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-13-billion-global-settlement [http://perma.cc/5Z 
MV-RMRL]; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners 
Secure Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading Investors About 
Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-
7-billion-global-settlement [http://perma.cc/BQ75-64FM]; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for 
Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-
settlement-financial-fraud-leading [http://perma.cc/GLY9-Q35P]. 
109 Jacob Davidson, Bank of America Is Paying Up for the Mortgage Mess, but Who 
Will Get the Money, TIME (Aug. 29, 2014), http://time.com/money/3177343/bank-of-
america-mortgage-settlement/ [http://perma.cc/5XJK-X3XT]; Alan Mallach, Now You See 
the Money, Now You Don’t, ROOFLINES (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.rooflines.org/3843/ 
now_you_see_the_money_now_you_dont/ [http://perma.cc/4SSB-VA4T].  
110 See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 19, at 1. 
111 COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT FUND, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
FUND, 2015 SUMMARY STATEMENT & INITIATIVES, at P-10, https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/ 
documents/huddoc?id=fy15cj_comm_dvlpt_fnd.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2S6-XC6G] (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2016). 
112 NSP Eligibility Requirements, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., 
https://www.hudexchange.info/nsp/nsp-eligibility-requirements [http://perma.cc/8D7A-
VKRZ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).  
113 Id. 
114 Some states ultimately succeeded in convincing the U.S. Treasury Department to 
redirect a small portion of the funds allocated for foreclosure prevention efforts to fund 
vacant property demolition costs. See Alan Mallach, Hardest Hit Funds Demolition Policy 
Change on Track to Become a Boon for Distressed Communities, CTR. FOR COMMUNITY 
PROGRESS (July 1, 2014), http://www.communityprogress.net/blog/federal-policy-change-
leads-results-ground-hardest-hit-funds-demolish-derelict-houses [https://perma.cc/J48T-
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most community stabilization efforts have instead taken place at the local level 
through initiatives like land banks, strategic demolition, vacant property registration 
ordinances, and public nuisance lawsuits.115 Often, however, these initiatives have 
proceeded without the support of and sometimes even with resistance from the 
federal government.116 
The final category is tax relief. Congress has provided income-tax relief to 
many homeowners who struggled with their mortgages as a result of the Foreclosure 
Crisis and (a) obtained principal reductions from their lenders, (b) sold or transferred 
their homes to avoid foreclosure, or (c) lost their homes to foreclosure. These 
transactions often involve the mortgage lender’s forgiveness of a portion of the 
homeowner’s debt in an amount roughly equatable to the home’s lost value. 
Congress passed the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (“MFDRA”), 
which as a general matter excluded a homeowner’s canceled or reduced mortgage 
debt from the income tax that would normally apply to it.117 Approximately 6.9 
million mortgage “liquidations” (i.e., foreclosures, short sales,118 and deeds in lieu 
of foreclosures119) and another 545,000 mortgage principal reductions occurred 
between 2007 and the end of 2013 alone, and the MFDRA spared many of these 
homeowners from tax on what the legislation’s drafters termed “phantom 
income.”120 Although the MFDRA originally expired at the end of 2013, Congress 
has since twice extended it to include mortgage debt forgiven through the end of 
2016.121  
                                                 
3NYS]. Again, however, the funds approved for redirection were small relative to the task 
of helping housing markets in the Hardest Hit Communities recover. 
115 David P. Weber, Zombie Mortgages, Real Estate, and the Fallout for the Survivors, 
45 N.M. L. REV. 37, 50–57 (2014).  
116 See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chi., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1044 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013). 
117 Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, § 2, 121 Stat. 
1803, 1803–04 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 108 (2012)). 
118 See INVESTOPEDIA, DEFINITION OF REAL ESTATE SHORT SALE. A real estate short 
sale is a sale of real estate that generates proceeds that are less than what the owner/borrower 
owes on the property and typically occurs when the lender and borrower decide that selling 
the property and absorbing a moderate loss is preferable to having the borrower default on 
the loan. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/real-estate-short-sale.asp?layout=orig 
[https://perma.cc/Z4JL-VP6T]. 
119 See INVESTOPEDIA, DEFINITION OF DEED IN LIEU OF FORECLOSURE. A deed in lieu of 
foreclosure is a transaction in which a borrower on a mortgage loan deeds the collateral 
property to the lender in exchange for the release of all obligations under the mortgage. 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deed_in_lieu_of_foreclosure.asp#ixzz4366wHYKT 
[https://perma.cc/Y5YM-7377]. 
120 Laurie Goodman & Ellen Seidman, The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act Has 
Expired—Renewal Could Benefit Millions, HOUSING FIN. POL’Y CTR. COMMENT., Feb. 17, 
2014, at 1, 2–3. The term “phantom income” was used frequently on the House and Senate 
floors during discussion of this legislation. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. 26,626–27 (2007) 
(statement of Rep. Cardoza). 
121 Congress most recently extended the provisions of the MFRDA through the end of 
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B.  Critiquing the Responses from the Perspective of the Hardest Hit Communities 
 
The responses to the Foreclosure Crisis detailed above have been, to varying 
degrees, too limited, too sanguine, and too narrow to adequately address the problem 
of permanently damaged home values in the Hardest Hit Communities. The market 
stabilization, community stabilization, and, to a large extent, foreclosure prevention 
strategies have primarily functioned as efforts to stop the bleeding caused by the 
Crisis. By aiming to create conditions that theoretically stabilize housing markets 
and then exiting the stage, each of these strategies assumed that home prices would 
ultimately rebound on their own and restore most, if not all, of homeowners’ lost 
equity. However, the political will to fund these initiatives began to evaporate as the 
national housing market ended its freefall, but well before many communities had 
shown signs of recovering home values.122 Moreover, as Part II of this Article 
demonstrated, housing markets in the Hardest Hit Communities suffered such 
significant structural damage that meaningful home price recovery is at best a 
longer-term proposition.  
The principal reduction and tax relief strategies, on the other hand, address the 
issue of damage to home values more squarely. Principal reduction accomplishes 
this by eliminating a portion of the debt that a homeowner owes on her home 
mortgage to better reflect the home’s reduction in market value. For example, 
consider a homeowner who purchased a home for $200,000 in 2007, took out a 
mortgage for the entire amount, and has made only interest payments to this point. 
If the home is now worth $150,000, she has suffered a $50,000 reduction in her net 
worth. But, if the bank reduces her mortgage principal to $150,000, it completely 
eradicates her reduction in net worth and effectively resets her purchase price to 
match the home’s reduced value. Furthermore, the MFRDA eliminates the tax that 
the homeowner would have had to pay on the $50,000 in canceled debt.123 Assuming 
she has a marginal income-tax rate of 25%, she has avoided a $12,500 tax bill. As 
this Article will later explain, the MFRDA allows the taxpayer to avoid tax on a 
portion of her original purchase price equatable to the home’s reduction in value.  
While potentially effective at dealing with the problem of permanently 
damaged home values, banks and mortgage servicers have largely resisted principal 
reduction. Furthermore, the MHA initiatives incentivized principal reduction for 
only those homeowners who were in default or at serious risk of default on their 
mortgages. As a result, they have reached only a small percentage of those whose 
home values suffered significant damage. The strong majority of homeowners with 
underwater mortgages have made their regular mortgage payments on time.124 
Others have paid enough on their mortgages that they are not underwater and thus, 
                                                 
2016 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act. Pub. L. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2016). 
122 See generally Immergluck, supra note 21, at 218 (discussing the congressional 
climate regarding financial crisis legislation from 2009 to 2012). 
123 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (2012). 
124 Gudell, supra note 18.  
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are even more likely to be making payments on time. Plus, about one-third of all 
homeowners do not have a mortgage.125 In the Hardest Hit Communities, the 
Foreclosure Crisis caused significant and permanent home-value damage for all 
homeowners, but most have not been and are not candidates for principal reduction 
nor, more importantly for purposes of this Article, for the exclusion from tax of their 
homes’ damaged values that the MFRDA essentially provides. Taken as a whole, 
the responses to the Crisis have, to date, largely overlooked these homeowners. 
 
IV.  TAX CODE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL LOSSES 
 
This Part summarizes how the IRC treats personal losses and why, as 
preparation for proposing how permanent damage to home values in the Hardest Hit 
Communities ought to be treated. It is helpful to also include here some discussion 
of the IRC’s treatment of personal expenses, as there is a close correlation between 
the two. 
 
A.  The General Rule 
 
As a general rule, a taxpayer’s personal expenses and losses, including a decline 
in the value of her home or other property she uses for personal purposes, are not 
deductible from taxable income.126 Put another way, a taxpayer must pay for 
personal-use goods and services (a.k.a. consumption) with dollars that are taxed. 
This is in contrast to a taxpayer’s expenses and losses that arise from operating a 
business or pursuing other profit-seeking activities, which are, as a general matter, 
deductible127 because they are viewed as outlays necessary to generate income.128 In 
short, the cost of earning a living is deductible, but the cost of living is not.129 
This is consistent with the widely acknowledged Haig-Simons definition of 
income,130 paraphrased as the change in a person’s wealth plus her consumption 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 26 U.S.C. §§ 165, 262. 
127 Id. §§ 162, 165. 
128 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A 
LAW STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 117 (13th ed. 2015). 
129 Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 925, 952 (1967). 
130 The Haig-Simons definition is the refinement by Henry C. Simons of a definition of 
income set forth by Robert M. Haig. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic 
and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921); 
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938). It is the most commonly accepted definition of 
income among economists, and it provides a baseline for evaluating the equity of an income 
tax. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 84 (7th ed. 2013); David G. Duff, Rethinking the Concept of Income in Tax 
Law and Policy 2 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/Duff.pdf [https://perma.cc/R873-CEJY] (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2016).   
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during a taxable period.131 The use of an income tax to allocate society’s tax burden 
is premised on the notion that a taxpayer’s accessions to wealth (i.e., income) are a 
fair measure of her ability to pay taxes.132 As a general matter, personal income is 
either saved or consumed.133 So consumption must be included in a taxpayer’s 
income-tax base in order to accurately calculate the taxpayer’s income and to avoid 
unfairly preferencing those who spend more of their income rather than save it.134  
While elegant in its simplicity, the rule against the deductibility of personal 
losses is imprecise.135 First, it makes an asset’s purpose an all-or-nothing 
classification.136 Even if a taxpayer acquires an asset for both personal use and with 
the expectation that it will appreciate and be sold for a profit, the asset is classified 
as used for one or the other purpose based on the taxpayer’s primary motive.137 For 
example, the IRC assumes that a taxpayer’s primary residence is a personal-use 
asset.138 The reality of course is that most homeowners purchase their home with an 
eye toward more than just using it as a place to live. It is also an investment that they 
expect over time will appreciate in value.139  
Second, once an asset has been classified as for personal use, all of its loss in 
value will be attributed to personal consumption.140 This is an inexact assumption. 
A car may lose value due to wear and tear from its anticipated use. Or it may lose 
value for reasons wholly unrelated to the taxpayer’s use and enjoyment of it (e.g., 
market demand for that particular type of car decreases sharply because the public 
becomes aware that its air bags don’t properly deploy). In the first scenario, the car’s 
lost value clearly reflects consumption; in the second scenario, the lost value does 
                                                 
131 SAMUEL A. DONALDSON & DONALD B. TOBIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 58 (2012); Gilbert E. Metcalf, Consumption Taxation, TAX 
POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/encyclopedia/Consumption-
Taxation.cfm [http://perma.cc/7VCQ-XV4Z] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
132 Julio Escolano, Taxing Consumption/Expenditure Versus Taxing Income, in TAX 
POLICY HANDBOOK 50, 51 (Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995). 
133 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 408 (19th 
ed. 2010). 
134 See, e.g., Joel S. Newman, Of Taxes and Other Casualties, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 
949 (1983). 
135 See Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal 
Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON. 193, 203–04 (1973); Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction 
for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unresolved Problem, 122 U. PA. 
L. REV. 859, 859–62 (1974). 
136 See Helvering v. Nat’l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 289 n.5 (1938); Austin v. 
Comm’r, 298 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1962). 
137 Austin, 298 F.2d at 584. 
138 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 128, at 400. 
139 See, e.g., Eric S. Belsky, The Dream Lives On: The Future of Homeownership in 
America 4–6 (Joint Ctr. of Hous. Studies, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. W13-1, 2013) 
(citing several surveys gauging American attitudes toward home ownership and finding that 
the belief that home ownership is a good long-term investment continues to be widely held 
even after the Foreclosure Crisis).  
140 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 128, at 117. 
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not arrive from any meaningful use by its owner and so its connection to 
consumption is debatable.141 Nevertheless, the IRC treats these scenarios identically 
by not allowing a deduction for either.142  
 
B.  The Casualty-Loss and Theft Exceptions 
 
As with many general rules in the tax code, there are exceptions. The IRC 
permits deductions for personal losses in some circumstances. The principal 
exceptions are the deductions provided under IRC § 165(c)(3) for uninsured 
damages to a taxpayer’s personal property arising from disasters and other casualties 
like storms, fires, and floods, and from theft.143 For casualty losses, the amount 
deductible is the property’s reduction in fair market value caused by the casualty (or, 
alternatively, the cost of restoring the property to its precasualty condition), subject 
to certain statutory and basis limitations.144 The net effect is that a portion of the 
dollars the taxpayer spent on personal consumption (i.e., to purchase the property) 
equatable to the damage incurred is removed from the tax base via a deduction. 
Some assert that the casualty-loss and theft deductions are examples of “tax 
expenditures.”145 In essence, tax expenditures are special exceptions to how the 
income tax is normally assessed meant to provide tax benefits to particular 
taxpayers.146 Seen in this light, § 165(c)(3) is a tax subsidy aimed at aiding those 
                                                 
141 There is some debate among theorists over whether consumption is understood to 
mean the opportunity to consume or actual consumption. Some argue for viewing losses to 
personal assets using an ex ante approach in which consumption is measured at the moment 
the taxpayer makes a consumption expenditure and before the asset experiences losses in 
value. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Valuing Personal Consumption: Cost Versus Value and the 
Impact of Insurance, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 12–28 (1992). A more conventional view and one 
that I subscribe to in this Article is that consumption should be measured based on the 
taxpayer’s use and enjoyment of the goods and services at issue. See, e.g., William D. 
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 313 (1972); 
Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in READINGS 
IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 55 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959). 
142 26 U.S.C. § 165(a), (c) (2012). 
143 Technically it is 26 U.S.C. § 165(a) that provides for the deduction for individual 
losses, but since it is § 165(c)(3) that describes casualty losses, this Article will refer to the 
latter in discussing the casualty-loss deduction. 
144 Id.; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-7, 1.165-8 (2014) (setting forth the amount deductible). 
For statutory limitations, see 26 U.S.C. § 165(h)(1), (2) and infra Part VII. Furthermore, the 
amount deductible cannot exceed the property’s “adjusted basis prescribed in § 1.1011-1 for 
determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of the property involved.” Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.165-7(b)(1)(ii); see infra note 306 and accompanying text. 
145 See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 21–23, 193 (1973) (asserting that personal-tax deductions are not 
refinements to the concept of income, but rather tax subsidies). 
146 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 130, at 39–45 (including an excerpt from STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 (Comm. Print 2013)). Tax expenditures also included tax credits, 
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who have suffered damage to or theft of their property by partially offsetting their 
losses. Proponents of this line of thinking might call for eliminating these deductions 
if, on review, they are determined to be inefficient ways of delivering relief to those 
harmed by a casualty or theft or not of sufficient value to taxpayers relative to the 
loss in tax revenue that they cause.147 
Others justify these deductions as necessary to accurately measure a taxpayer’s 
income.148 One rationale proffered for viewing the casualty-loss and theft deductions 
as “normative” tax provisions is that losses caused by these events do not arise from 
the taxpayer’s consumption of the property.149 Consider a taxpayer who is robbed of 
$2,000 in cash in a burglary and is not insured for this loss. Clearly the money has 
been removed from the taxpayer’s store of wealth, but not due to any meaningful act 
of consumption by the taxpayer.150 Applying the Haig-Simons definition of income, 
a reduction in wealth not attributable to consumption should be deducted from the 
taxpayer’s income-tax base.151 
This rationale applies identically to an errant shot from a BB gun that breaks an 
antique window on a taxpayer’s house worth $2,000. If uninsured, the taxpayer 
incurs a reduction in her wealth, and, if it is not attributable to her personal 
consumption, then under Haig-Simons it is deductible.152 Of course, the same might 
be argued for other market value declines not directly attributable to personal 
consumption (like changes in consumer preferences), but the IRC does not as a 
general matter allow for their deduction. So the deductions allowable under § 
165(c)(3) could be explained as instances of Congress recognizing the IRC’s 
imprecision in its general treatment of all declines in value in personal-use assets as 
consumption (referred to in this Article as the “nonconsumption rationale”). 
A closely related, though not entirely identical, normative rationale is premised 
on the taxpayer’s ability to pay tax on the amount taken via casualty or theft.153 As 
noted earlier, an assumption underlying the adoption of an income tax in the IRC is 
that it provides the best measurement of a taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes and that 
ability to pay considerations should guide Congress in determining how the IRC 
defines taxable income.154 Returning to the example of the taxpayer robbed of 
                                                 
preferred tax rates, and tax deferrals. Id. at 39. 
147 See SURREY, supra note 145, at 179–203. 
148 See generally BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS ¶ 24.01 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing rationales for casualty deductions). 
149 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 135, at 196–99; Richard A. Epstein, The Consumption 
and Loss of Personal Property Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REV. 454, 
471–72 (1971). 
150 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 130, at 362. 
151 Bittker, supra note 135, at 196–99; John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The 
Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. 
TAX L. 203, 244–45 (2011). 
152 Bittker, supra note 135, at 196–99. 
153 BITTKER ET AL., supra note 148, at ¶ 24.01; GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 130, at 
361; Newman, supra note 134, at 942–45. 
154 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
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$2,000, because she no longer possesses the $2,000, she theoretically has no money 
with which to pay the taxes on it. Stolen property (or property damaged by a 
casualty) is a sudden, unexpected and unusual subtraction from the taxpayer’s net 
worth and likewise a reduction in her ability to pay taxes that she could not have 
anticipated. Accordingly, it should be removable from her taxable income (referred 
to in this Article as the “ability to pay rationale”). In its limited mentions of the 
justification for the casualty-loss and theft deductions, Congress refers to § 165(c)(3) 
as motivated by ability to pay concerns.155 
 
C.  Ad Hoc Interventions 
 
Congress has also made temporary and ad hoc modifications to the IRC in other 
cases to allow taxpayers experiencing significant, personal, financial harm caused 
by sudden, unexpected and unusual forces to remove otherwise taxable personal 
consumption dollars from their income-tax bases. It is worth pausing at this point to 
note that the IRC provides two closely related mechanisms for removing dollars 
from taxable income—exclusions from income and deductions.156 The difference 
between them is principally a matter of timing. An exclusion prevents specified 
dollars from entering the pool of gross income in the first place, while a deduction 
subtracts specified dollars from gross income in the course of computing taxable 
income.157 But the objective is the same: the removal of certain dollars from the tax 
base that Congress has determined should not be taxed.  
That said, a good example of this type of ad hoc intervention is when Congress 
has excluded certain discharged consumer debt from income tax. Normally, a 
taxpayer must pay tax on all dollars that she borrows to pay for personal 
consumption (e.g., a mortgage on a home) because they are treated like any other 
dollar spent on consumption.158 Via the IRC, the borrower pays this tax not when 
she receives the loan, but as she repays it with after-tax dollars.159 When a lender  
 
 
 
                                                 
155 S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 115–16 (1982) (invoking “ability to pay” multiple times as 
the rationale for the deductions); S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 57 (1964) (stating “casualty and theft 
losses will continue to be deductible (over the $100 [threshold]) in those cases where they 
are sufficient in size to have a significant effect upon an individual’s ability to pay Federal 
income taxes”). 
156 GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 130, at 211. 
157 Id. Because they arise at different points in the process, some deductions are subject 
to floors and limits that prevent removal of the full amount and thus an exclusion from 
income is often more advantageous to a taxpayer than a deduction. Id. 
158 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E), (a)(2)(C), (h) (2012). 
159 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 128, at 61; The Housing Decline: Extent of 
the Problem and Potential Remedies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 7, 
at 38–39 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing: The Housing Decline] (statement of Deborah A. Geier, 
Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University). 
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cancels some or all of this debt, the IRC still taxes the borrower on the amount 
discharged, recognizing that otherwise dollars the borrower received and 
presumably spent on personal consumption would be removed from the tax base.160  
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and several catastrophic weather 
events that plagued the Midwest in 2008, Congress excluded from tax, subject to 
certain limitations, cancelled personal consumption debt (including home 
mortgages) for those taxpayers with primary residences in areas heavily damaged 
by these events who either did or were assumed to have suffered “economic loss” as 
a result.161 Pursuant to the MFRDA (discussed in Part III), Congress did likewise for 
certain homeowners whose lenders cancelled a portion of their home-mortgage debt 
during and in the wake of the Foreclosure Crisis.162 Both of these measures allowed 
borrowers to remove what would otherwise be considered personal-consumption 
dollars from their tax base.  
Congressional testimony in support of the MFRDA made clear the normative 
income-tax links between the need for this remedy and the decrease in home values 
due to the Foreclosure Crisis. The testimony of a tax expert explained that in many 
cases home values fell during the Foreclosure Crisis not due to personal 
consumption, but instead due to unusual market forces.163 Accordingly, the 
cancelled debt that corresponded to this unusual drop in value and would normally 
represent taxable consumption should not be taxed as a normative matter.164 Several 
members of Congress identified the hardship to and inequity of taxpayers having to 
pay tax on debt discharge income that emanated from their homes’ sudden and 
unexpected losses in value (what many termed “phantom income”).165 This 
testimony reflects the same nonconsumption and ability to pay rationales I identified 
earlier as backstopping the casualty-loss deduction. 
 
D.  Summary 
 
So the answer to how the tax code treats personal losses is somewhat complex. 
As a general rule, a taxpayer cannot deduct personal losses because they represent 
consumption.166 For this reason, a taxpayer cannot normally deduct reductions in her 
                                                 
160 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 128, at 61. 
161 Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 401, 119 Stat. 
2016, 2026–27; Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 702(e)(4), 
122 Stat. 3765, 3918.  
162 Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-142, § 2, 122 Stat. 1803, 
1803–04 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E)(h) (2012)). 
163 Hearing: The Housing Decline, supra note 159, at 45. 
164 Id. 
165 See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. 35,952 (2007) (statement of Rep. Jones) (“Under current 
law, if your [h]ouse is under foreclosure and the bank discharges your debt, you receive a 
tax bill. . . . The resolution we consider today rectifies that disconnect so that if a person’s 
principal residence lost value, that loss won’t give rise to a tax liability.”). 
166 See supra Part IV.A.  
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home’s value upon the sale of her home or at any other time.167 As noted earlier, 
attributing all declines in the value of personal-use assets to personal consumption 
is overbroad and fails to account for losses in value attributable to other factors.168 
There is a long-standing exception to the general rule for losses in the value of 
personal-use property damaged or taken due to casualties, disasters, and thefts.169 
Also, Congress has stepped in on other occasions to allow taxpayers who have 
suffered personal financial harm due to particular sudden, unexpected and unusual 
events to exclude other amounts from their tax base that would normally represent 
personal consumption.170  
One plausible interpretation of these exceptions and interventions is that they 
are each independent tax expenditures enacted by an occasionally benevolent 
Congress as a public subsidy to those afflicted by certain calamities. The stronger 
position is that they reflect an overarching recognition, however inconsistent and 
sometimes inexact,171 that significant personal losses brought about by sudden, 
unexpected and unusual forces should, as a normative matter, be deducted from 
taxable income. The casualty-loss deduction is a long-standing and permanent 
component of the country’s income tax.172 Moreover, the exclusion of casualty 
losses from income squares comfortably with the Haig-Simons definition of income 
and the ability to pay concept that is intrinsic to the IRC.173 In its rare statements on 
the matter, congressional legislative history uses a normative explanation.174 The 
more recent ad hoc interventions are conceptually similar adjustments to taxable 
income justified by the same normative rationales as casualty losses and thus, can 
be thought of as sporadic offshoots of the IRC’s approach to casualty losses.  
Ultimately, it is not critical to the argument that follows that the normative 
interpretation carry the day. A quest for horizontal equity drives this Article’s 
argument that homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities should be able to deduct 
the permanent damage to their home values and horizontal equity considerations 
would apply under either interpretation. Recognizing the normative basis for the 
                                                 
167 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9 (2014). 
168 See supra Part IV.A. 
169 See supra Part IV.B. 
170 See supra Part IV.C. 
171 See, e.g., AM. INST. OF CPAS, NATURAL DISASTERS: THE CASE FOR PERMANENT 
TAX RELIEF 3 (2015), https://www.aicpa.org/advocacy/tax/downloadabledocuments/ 
automatic-tax-relief-for-natural-disaster-victims-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL6A-
7PEN] (providing commentary on the inequity of Congress providing tax relief via exclusion 
of debt discharge income and enhanced casualty-loss deductions, among other provisions for 
some catastrophic weather events but not others). 
172 Inclusion of a casualty-loss and theft deduction dates to the first iterations of the 
modern Internal Revenue Code. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 
(providing a deduction for losses to personal property from fire, shipwreck and storm). 
173 See, e.g., Janet Stotsky, The Base of the Personal Income Tax, in TAX POLICY 
HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 121, 123; William J. Turnier, Evaluating Personal 
Deductions in an Income Tax—The Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 262, 272 (1981).  
174 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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IRC’s approach to casualty losses does, however, arguably make this Article’s 
central proposal more compelling. Read through this lens, the proposal is about more 
than simply achieving consistency with recent Congressional interventions; it is also 
about correctly measuring taxable income.   
 
V.  THE CASE FOR TREATING DAMAGE TO HOME VALUES IN HARDEST HIT 
COMMUNITIES AS PERSONAL CASUALTY LOSSES 
 
Permanent damage to home values in the Hardest Hit Communities merit 
treatment as deductible casualty losses under the IRC. As explained below, the 
Foreclosure Crisis satisfies the principal qualitative jurisprudential standards for 
what constitutes a casualty. And yet, most relevant IRS rulings and judicial 
precedent indicate that a casualty-loss claim in this context would be rejected 
because the resulting damage is not physical. This Part will call into question the 
explanations for this distinction.  
Furthermore, allowing a deduction for homeowners in the Hardest Hit 
Communities is wholly consistent with the normative rationales that justify the 
deduction of casualty losses under an income tax. Accordingly, horizontal equity 
considerations prescribe that these homeowners be put on equal tax footing with 
others whose home values are damaged by a sudden, unexpected and unusual force. 
This Part also sets forth this argument.  
 
A.  Prologue: The Foreclosure Crisis as Catastrophe 
 
As the Foreclosure Crisis reached its apex, commentators, pundits, and 
politicians seemingly passed on no opportunity to liken the Crisis to a physical 
disaster. In 2007, CNN first identified an “epicenter” of the Crisis in Cleveland, 
Ohio.175 The national commission charged by Congress with investigating the causes 
of the Crisis published a report of its findings rife with apocalyptic imagery like 
“seismic proportions,” “the flame of contagion,” “human disaster,” and 
“catastrophe” to describe the immediate impact of the Crisis.176 Since then, studies 
have measured the “collateral damage” of the Crisis,177 cataloged “hot spots,”178 and 
contended that the Crisis is “still burning.”179 But perhaps no term has been more 
ubiquitous in association with the Crisis than “underwater.”180 In describing the 
loan-to-value condition of nearly one-third of American mortgages at the worst of 
the Crisis, the word is also apt imagery for the manner in which the Crisis suddenly 
and indiscriminately overwhelmed household finances when home prices fell and 
                                                 
175 Les Christie, Where Cleveland Went Wrong, CNN MONEY (Nov. 14, 2007, 3:44 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/12/real_estate/Cleveland_foreclosure_factors 
[http://perma.cc/6TUD-P6F4]. 
176 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at xv. 
177 See THE SPILLOVER COSTS OF FORECLOSURES, supra note 87, at 2. 
178 See HAAS REPORT, supra note 67, at 11. 
179 ElBoghdady, supra note 16. 
180 See, e.g., HAAS REPORT, supra note 67, at 5.  
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the wreckage left behind in many communities as the acute phase of the Crisis began 
to recede. 
It is more than just a penchant for analogy that has caused the Foreclosure Crisis 
to be described in such dramatic fashion. The fact that natural disasters usually carry 
with them a loss of life makes a full comparison with a financial crisis hard to make. 
But there is little arguing that the physical and financial impact on many of the 
Hardest Hit Communities has resembled that of a disaster scene. For sake of 
comparison, Hurricane Katrina, which by most accounts was the worst natural 
disaster in United States history, caused $100 billion in property damage and $250 
billion in total economic loss, displaced 770,000 people from their homes and 
destroyed or made uninhabitable 300,000 homes.181 The Foreclosure Crisis has 
caused trillions of dollars in lost homeowner equity and household wealth, resulted 
in 5 million U.S. households losing their homes and accelerated home vacancy and 
abandonment in certain cities and neighborhoods at record rates.182 Of course, one 
might contend that the Foreclosure Crisis affected the entire United States, which 
might dilute its impact on any one area. But as Part II documented, the Crisis 
impacted some areas far worse than others, causing depopulation and physical 
deterioration on par with areas afflicted by a natural calamity. Accordingly, one 
would be hard-pressed to argue that the impact of the Crisis on the Hardest Hit 
Communities was anything less than catastrophic. 
 
B.  The Scope of the Personal Casualty-Loss Deduction 
 
Section 165(c)(3) of the IRC provides some balm for those who suffer property 
loss or damage due to an unexpected and damaging outside force. As noted earlier, 
it allows a taxpayer a deduction from taxable income, subject to certain statutory 
and basis limits, for unreimbursed losses on personal-use property caused by “fire, 
storm, shipwreck, or other casualty.”183 Little controversy has arisen from claims for 
the deduction arising out of major motion picture style natural events like hurricanes, 
tornados, earthquakes, and ice storms, all of which clearly fall within the statute’s 
scope. By contrast, significant debate (and litigation) has resulted from alleged 
casualties that are slower acting,184 man-made,185 and mundane.186 In almost every 
such debate, the IRS has initially taken the stingiest position on what qualifies as a 
casualty loss and put the onus on the courts to expand the definition.187 
                                                 
181 Kimberly Amadeo, Hurricane Katrina Facts: Damage and Economic Effects, 
ABOUT NEWS, http://useconomy.about.com/od/grossdomesticproduct/f/katrina_damage.htm 
[http://perma.cc/Z4UB-FW2C] (last updated Oct. 21, 2015).   
182 See supra Part II. 
183 26 U.S.C. § 165(c)(3) (2012). 
184 E.g., Rev. Rul. 90-61, 1990-2 C.B. 39; Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. United States, 32 Fed. 
Cl. 80, 97–99 (1994) (addressing damage to timber by southern pine beetles). 
185 E.g., Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d 995, 996 (2d Cir. 1927) (addressing damage to 
claimant’s automobile alledgedly due to another’s faulty driving). 
186 E.g., White v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 430, 434 (1967) (addressing a lost wedding ring). 
187 See supra notes 184–186. 
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Disagreement over the scope of the deduction typically stems from the fact that 
neither the IRC nor any of its clarifying regulations define what is meant by “or other 
casualty.” With nowhere else to turn but the plain meaning of the term “casualty,” 
courts frequently invoke the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis (“of the same 
kind”)188 in interpreting the phrase to mean other events that share the common 
characteristics of fires, storms, and shipwreck.189 Drawing from case law, the IRS 
has identified broadly what these characteristics are. Revenue Ruling 72-592 sets 
forth the agency’s position that a “casualty” is an identifiable event that causes 
damage and is “sudden, unexpected and unusual.”190 Also relevant, but certainly no 
more definitive, is the very limited legislative history explaining the purpose of the 
deduction as for “those losses which may be considered extraordinary, nonrecurring 
losses, and which go beyond the average or usual losses incurred by most taxpayers 
in day-to-day living.”191 
The absence of an explicit definition and the wide range of events that cause 
some form of damage to property has resulted in case law that is, in the words of 
one court, “difficult to reconcile with others either in result, theory, or language.”192 
Just a few highlights of the head-scratching distinctions include conclusions that 
overheated home boilers cause casualty losses,193 but overheated car engines do 
not;194 a husband who accidentally slammed a car door on his wife’s finger, jarring 
loose the diamond from her wedding ring, caused a deductible casualty loss,195 while 
another who accidentally flushed his wife’s ring down the toilet was merely careless 
and could not claim a deduction;196 and the disappearance of a U.S. citizen’s 
household possessions while in transport in Iran in 1979 resulted in a casualty loss 
likely attributable to civil unrest and violence,197 while the East German 
government’s seizure of a U.S. citizen’s newly purchased Volkswagen was a 
despotic act but not a casualty.198 In other instances, judicial and administrative 
interpretations of whether a particular force qualifies as a casualty have evolved, 
reversed course, or received different treatment among jurisdictions.199 One 
                                                 
188 “A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list 
of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same 
class as those listed.” Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
189 United States v. Rogers, 122 F.2d 485, 485 (9th Cir. 1941); Keenan v. Bowers, 91 
F. Supp. 771, 774–75 (E.D.S.C. 1950). 
190 Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972-2 C.B. 101; see also Matheson v. Comm’r, 54 F.2d 537, 539 
(2d Cir. 1931) (stating that casualty “is an event due to some sudden, unexpected, or unusual 
cause”).  
191 S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 57 (1964). 
192 Heyn v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 302, 309 (1966). 
193 Keenan, 91 F. Supp. at 774. 
194 Newton v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 245, 248 (1971). 
195 White v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 430, 433–34, 438 (1967). 
196 Keenan, 91 F. Supp. at 775. 
197 Clem v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 586, 589 (1991). 
198 Powers v. Comm’r, 36 T.C. 1191, 1192–93 (1961). 
199 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 63-232, 1963-2 C.B. 97 (cataloguing cases and rulings showing 
the IRS reversing its position and splits among courts on termite damage). 
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commentator has attributed this inconsistency to a central flaw in the statute—
namely, that it seeks to make a form of economic loss deductible from the tax base 
by utilizing an incomplete list of forces that cause the loss, rather than by more 
carefully describing the nature of the loss itself.200 In any case, the concept of 
“casualty loss” is hardly airtight, but instead subject to interpretation in accordance 
with IRC §165(c)(3)’s inexact language and the broad principles underlying its 
adoption. 
 
C.  “Sudden, Unexpected and Unusual” 
 
The definition in IRS Revenue Ruling 72-592 is the starting point for most 
assessments of whether an event is a casualty. It provides in pertinent part that a 
casualty must result from an event that is “sudden, unexpected and unusual” and 
that: 
 
To be ‘sudden’ the event must be one that is swift and precipitous and not 
gradual or progressive.  
 
To be ‘unexpected’ the event must be one that is ordinarily unanticipated 
that occurs without the intent of the one who suffers the loss.  
 
To be ‘unusual’ the event must be one that is extraordinary and 
nonrecurring, one that does not commonly occur during the activity in 
which the taxpayer was engaged when the destruction or damage occurred, 
and one that does not commonly occur in the ordinary course of day-to-
day living of the taxpayer.201 
 
The Foreclosure Crisis easily satisfies two out of the three components of this 
definition. First, it was unexpected. The likelihood of a total collapse of the housing 
market certainly eluded the attention of most mortgage and housing industry experts, 
government regulators, and investors at large.202 Thus, it would be hard to argue that 
the average homeowner could or should have expected the Crisis. Furthermore, the 
decline in home values spurred by the Crisis was of a magnitude that far exceeded 
any other in recorded U.S. history and reversed a long-running trend of price 
appreciation in the housing market.203 So, it was also clearly unusual. 
Open to some debate, on the other hand, is the question of whether the Crisis 
was sudden enough to qualify as a casualty. The IRS defines “sudden” in this context 
                                                 
200 Federal Income Tax: The Dilemma of the Casualty Loss Deduction, 1961 DUKE L.J. 
440, 444–45 (1961). 
201 Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972-2 C.B. 101.  
202 See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 
(noting that several banking industry experts and regulators referred to the collapse in home 
prices as completely unanticipated). 
203 See SHILLER, supra note 3, at 13 fig.2.1. 
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as “swift and precipitous, and not gradual or progressive.”204 The IRS often gauges 
suddenness in terms of hours and days.205 Courts have drawn a similar line, refusing 
to classify as casualties events that cause progressive deterioration through a 
“steadily operating cause,” including rust, corrosion, and decay.206  
The Foreclosure Crisis presents a dilemma in this regard. Its full impact was 
not experienced in a matter of moments, as are most accidents, or in a matter of 
hours or days, as is true of most natural calamities. There was no singular moment 
at which the Crisis began. Rather, it developed through a series of events that 
unfolded over several months, impacted different regions of the country at different 
points in time, and caused damage over a period of years.207 The IRS would almost 
certainly challenge classification of the Crisis as a casualty on these grounds. 
Three considerations should weigh heavily in supporting the argument that the 
Foreclosure Crisis was in fact a sudden event. The first is that courts have not 
interpreted “suddenness” according to any fixed period of time, but instead 
addressed the issue on a case-by-case basis. The case law concedes that casualty 
losses “may exist in a variety of backgrounds in respect of which the rapidity and 
detection of the damage may vary considerably . . . . ”208 Droughts, pests, and 
diseases are all examples of more prolonged events that have caused substantial 
litigation and divergent results over whether they qualify as casualties.209 Often 
determinative in these cases is whether the damaging event in question occurred in 
a manner that is sudden relative to how similar events typically unfold.210 As noted 
earlier, when viewed relative to prior economic downturns and variations in home 
price values over the long-term, the onset of the Foreclosure Crisis was incredibly 
rapid and its impact unusually sharp. 
The second consideration is the unresolved position of the jurisprudence on 
how quickly damage resulting from a casualty must manifest in order for it to be 
considered part of a casualty loss. The current formal stance of the IRS is that not 
only the precipitating event, but also the damage, must occur suddenly (the so-called 
“elapsed time theory”).211 It has used the elapsed time theory to disregard casualty-
loss claims for damages that invasive pests have caused to trees and structures that 
                                                 
204 Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972-2 C.B. 101. 
205 See, e.g., Marx v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1370, 1373 (1991) (overruling IRS 
determination that faulty roof repair and resulting damage from rainfall a few weeks later 
was not sudden enough to qualify as a casualty); Nelson v. Comm’r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 158, 
162 (1968) (overruling IRS determination that a mass attack of beetles that killed trees in 
five to ten days was not sudden enough to qualify as a casualty). 
206 Fay v. Helvering, 120 F.2d 253, 253 (2d Cir. 1941) (per curiam). 
207 See supra Part II. 
208 Kilroe v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 1304, 1306 (1959). 
209 See BITTKER ET AL., supra note 148, at ¶ 24.02 n.11. 
210 Rosenberg v. Comm’r, 198 F.2d 46, 47 (8th Cir. 1952); Hoppe v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 
820, 823–24 (1964); Kilroe, 32 T.C. at 1306. 
211 Dale Lee Berg, III & Robert A. Swiech, Identifying the Correct Kind of Loss 
Resulting from Mountain Pine Beetle Damage, 114 J. TAX’N 244, 247–48 (2011). 
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did not occur immediately after the invasion.212 However, the IRS only arrived at 
this stance after several reversals of position, including a period of time when it 
subscribed to the contrary theory. Known as the “onset theory,” it focuses only on 
the suddenness of the precipitating event and allows casualty-loss deductions in 
subsequent years when residual damage manifests.213 Courts have not uniformly 
adopted the elapsed time theory and the most recent court to consider the issue 
adhered to the onset theory in recognizing casualty losses claimed in a year 
subsequent to the one in which a pine beetle attack ravaged a taxpayer’s timber 
inventory.214 The Foreclosure Crisis resembles casualties in case law that subscribes 
to the onset theory in that the shock to the mortgage industry that instigated the Crisis 
occurred relatively quickly, setting into motion damage that manifested over a 
longer period of time.  
Finally, and perhaps of greatest consequence, is the demonstrated willingness 
of the IRS to deviate from its own stance on suddenness. In 2010, the IRS, acting by 
administrative fiat and in cooperation with the Department of Treasury, issued a 
Revenue Procedure recognizing the casualty-loss claims of homeowners who, over 
an eight-year period, installed defective imported drywall.215 The drywall had a 
corrosive effect on the electrical wiring and copper components of household 
appliances in the homes in which it was used.216 These types of damages manifested 
gradually and so would have presumably precluded a claim of a casualty loss 
according to the official IRS position on suddenness.217 In using the Revenue 
Procedure to create a safe harbor for these types of claims, the IRS explicitly 
recognized corrosion as a force causing a casualty loss under IRC § 165(c)(3) in 
“view of the unique circumstances.”218 Just like the Foreclosure Crisis, the use of 
defective imported drywall did not commence at a singular moment in time, did not 
cause its damage within hours, days, months or even a few years, and affected 
different homeowners at different points in time. Revenue Procedure 2010-36 stands 
either for the proposition that the IRS subscribes to a more expansive definition of 
“suddenness” than it usually articulates or that suddenness is not actually an absolute 
necessity for a casualty-loss claim. Bearing all of these considerations in mind, the 
Foreclosure Crisis should actually fit quite comfortably within the jurisprudential 
bounds of suddenness and meet the principal qualitative standards for classification 
as a casualty. 
  
                                                 
212 Id. 
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215 Rev. Proc. 2010-36, 2010-42 I.R.B. 439. 
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loss claim based on damage caused by corrosion because the damage was not sudden). 
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D.  Questioning the Physical Damage “Requirement” 
 
Notwithstanding the often shifting boundaries of the meaning of “other 
casualty,” the case law appears to be fairly well settled in one respect that would be 
quite problematic for anyone seeking to claim that damage to their home’s value 
caused by the Foreclosure Crisis is a casualty loss. According to the IRS and most 
courts, only physical damage counts.219  
One or both of two explanations are typically used in supporting this position. 
The first is ejusdem generis.220 Since fires, storms, and shipwrecks all cause physical 
damage, so must other casualties, the reasoning goes.221 On these grounds, home-
value declines allegedly attributable to neighbors’ harassment222 and snooping 
tourists (“looky-loos”)223 have failed to qualify. 
The second explanation is rooted in the IRC’s longheld administrative rule that 
a taxpayer can only claim a loss that has been fully “realized.” In order to be 
deductible, “a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions, fixed 
by identifiable events.”224 This rule serves, as a general matter, to ensure that 
taxpayers only deduct losses they have genuinely suffered and will not later recoup. 
Although a casualty is considered a realization event, courts and the IRS have 
pointed to the realization rule in distinguishing between physical damage, 
considered irreversible and thus deductible, and a decrease in a property’s value due 
to a market fluctuation, which may ultimately rebound.225  
Courts find support for this explanation in one of the regulations that amplifies 
§ 165(c)(3). Regulation 1.165–7 provides that a claim for a casualty-loss deduction 
must “recognize the effects of any general market decline affecting undamaged as 
well as damaged property which may occur simultaneously with the casualty, in 
order that any deduction under this section shall be limited to the actual loss resulting 
from damage to the property.”226 In cases involving a casualty like an earthquake, 
which causes both physical damage to a home and a drop in the home’s value due 
to a concern that the casualty may reoccur (a so-called “buyer resistance” claim), 
buyer resistance is typically chalked up to “general market decline.”227 These cases, 
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many of which are from the Ninth Circuit, where natural calamities occur more 
frequently, have come to stand for the proposition that only physical damage is 
deductible.228  
While compelling in their straightforwardness, the explanations for the 
physical-damage requirement have serious gaps in reasoning. One, of course, is that 
neither § 165(c)(3) nor Regulation 1.165-7 requires physical damage. In fact, the 
phrase “physical damage” does not appear anywhere in these provisions. The terms 
used are “losses” and “damage”;229 “physical damage” is arrived at only by 
inference. It bears repeating that the limited legislative history regarding the impetus 
for the casualty-loss deduction describes these losses as those that are 
“extraordinary,” “recurring,” and “beyond the average or usual expenses 
incurred . . . in day-to-day living.”230 The IRS in identifying the essential features of 
a casualty settled on “sudden, unexpected and unusual,” but did not include the word 
“physical.”231 Nothing within these criteria compels excluding nonphysical damage. 
Furthermore, when examined closely, Regulation 1.165-7 seems focused on the 
need to establish a causal relationship between the casualty and the damage, rather 
than on distinguishing between physical and nonphysical damage.232 It requires that 
an appraisal recognize any simultaneously occurring “general market decline” 
affecting taxpayer’s damaged and undamaged property so that the loss claimed is 
limited to “actual loss resulting from damage to the property.”233 Interpreted literally 
it provides that only that portion of the property that the casualty has actually 
damaged is deductible. In the case at hand, the Foreclosure Crisis caused damage to 
home values and so this is what would be deductible. 
This interpretation is bolstered when taking into account the Regulation’s 
choice of the phrase “simultaneously occurring” to modify a “general market 
decline” that should not be included in the claimed loss.234 “Simultaneous” suggests 
an event occurring at the same time but independent of the casualty (as opposed to 
“corresponding” or “resulting”). For example, a hurricane could strike a town that 
is already experiencing a decline in home values due to the departure of a major 
employer. The Regulation would prevent a fair market appraisal from taking this 
simultaneous and independent market force into account in assessing the casualty 
loss due to the hurricane. But the same rule should not apply to a decline in fair 
market value that is a direct result of the damage imposed by the hurricane since the 
event and the decline in value are inextricably related.    
At its root, judicial and IRS adherence to a physical-damage requirement likely 
results more from a concern over recognizing unrealized losses than from an interest 
                                                 
228 See, e.g., Lund v. U.S., No. 2-97-CV-0078-S, 2000 WL 300394, at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 
20, 2000); Caan v. United States, No. CV 98-4833-GHK SHX, 1999 WL 250753, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 26, 1999); Pang v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1252 (2011).  
229 See 26 U.S.C. § 165 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.165–7.  
230 S. REP. NO. 88-830, at 57 (1964). 
231 Rev. Rul. 72-592, 1972-2 C.B. 101.  
232 Treas. Reg. § 1.165–7(a)(2)(i). 
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in precise statutory interpretation. In order to qualify as a casualty loss, a home-value 
decline would have to represent more than a temporary or specious dip in value. 
Otherwise, how would the IRS (and taxpayers) deal with market value declines, no 
matter how sympathetic the circumstances, that later recover? Would taxpayers have 
to refund previous deductions? And how could such a deduction be justified to other 
taxpayers whose personal property fluctuates in value due to circumstances beyond 
their control?  
 
E.  Permanent Transition to a Lower Value Plateau 
 
The answer is that the damage to a taxpayer’s home value would have to 
comply with the realization rule and constitute a permanent loss. Of course, physical 
damage is easier to identify as such; it is objectively observable and nonrecoverable 
absent some human intervention to fix it. A drop in market value can potentially 
reverse course at a moment’s notice and is based purely on a change in buyers’ 
whims. 
A critical concept for addressing this concern and crystallizing the concept of 
permanent nonphysical losses in market value is found in a case decided by the 
Eleventh Circuit in 1986, Finkbohner v. United States,235 which is the principal 
outlier on the question of whether physical damage is required for a casualty loss. 
The case involved a casualty-loss deduction claimed by homeowners in Mobile, 
Alabama whose home was largely bypassed by a flood severe enough that several 
of their neighbors’ homes had to be demolished.236 The city later concluded that 
because of future flood risks the demolished homes should not be replaced, but 
instead maintained as permanent open space.237 The bulk of the homeowners’ claim 
consisted of the 20% drop in value of their home after the flood, attributable to 
decreased market demand rather than to physical damage to the home.238 
Unsurprisingly, the IRS rejected the claim, characterizing it as buyer 
resistance.239 In siding with the homeowners and the district court, the Eleventh 
Circuit made a distinction between temporary buyer resistance and a transition to a 
“lower value plateau” caused by permanent changes in the character of the 
neighborhood.240 In getting to that point, the court first recognized that buyers’ 
immediate unwillingness to pay as much for property in the neighborhood due to the 
recent flooding was a short-term response and not sufficient to justify a casualty 
loss.241 However, the permanent removal of seven out of twelve homes on a 
residential cul-de-sac so changed the amenities and attractiveness of the claimants’ 
home, “placing it in a lonesome neighborhood, more exposed to crime, and with 
much diminished privacy” that it caused a permanent and realized loss in value that 
                                                 
235 Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1986). 
236 Id. at 724. 
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could be claimed.242 Over time, the home’s value would inevitably change. But the 
court asserted that any subsequent appreciations or depreciations in value should be 
measured from this reduced figure.243 Thus, the court recognized the home’s 
reduction in value as a realized and deductible casualty loss. 
The U.S. Tax Court made a similar holding in its 1994 decision Beams v. 
Commissioner.244 A married couple owned multiple adjoining properties. After fire 
destroyed most of the forest cover on one of the undeveloped properties, the couple 
sought a casualty-loss deduction on the diminished value of one of the other parcels, 
on which their home stood.245 The IRS sought to classify this decline in value as a 
simultaneously occurring “general market decline,” but the court upheld a deduction 
based on the reduction in the home’s aesthetic value, separate and apart from any 
physical damage.246 In so doing, the Tax Court supported the homeowners’ 
contention that the home had experienced a permanent change in character and value 
because it now stood in “a field, rather than a forest.”247 
In its last official guidance on the issue of nonphysical damage, the IRS rejected 
the casualty-loss claim of a taxpayer whose property had lost market value due to a 
flood, attributing it to buyer resistance.248 In so doing, the agency expressed its 
position that the problem with the claim was that a decrease in value due to a 
“psychological resistance to inundated properties” is “short lived” and a “mere 
‘fluctuation’ in value,” and thus not “sustained.”249 This ruling is actually consistent 
with the holdings in Finkbohner and Beams. Short-term fluctuations in value are 
distinguishable from a permanent transition in value and thus not deductible.250 
Assessing the permanence of a property’s damage is a better conceptual 
barometer of its qualification as a casualty loss than simply treating all reductions in 
value due to nonphysical damage as unrealized. The latter approach, while 
administratively straightforward, unfairly preferences one permanent loss in value 
over another.251 For this reason, those that might contend that the nonphysical 
damage in Finkbohner and Beams at least had an event causing physical damage as 
a starting point place too much importance on the event causing the damage rather 
than the nature of the taxpayer’s loss. Insisting that only those nonphysical losses in 
value that arise from a “sudden, unusual and unexpected” event and that result from 
a change in the home’s value so substantial and entrenched that it locks in a lower 
plateau provides a meaningful threshold.  
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The Foreclosure Crisis provides dramatic examples of communities that have 
transitioned to a lower value plateau. Not unlike the facts in Finkbohner and Beams, 
occupied homes in the Hardest Hit Communities have been permanently impacted 
by the condition of the properties around them. In many of these communities, 
vacancy, deterioration, and demolition have left long-lasting scars on the physical 
and financial landscape of the neighborhoods that the remaining occupants inhabit. 
The fact that nearly a decade removed from the onset of the Crisis, homes in these 
communities have recovered little or none of their lost value is evidence of a 
completed transition that is difficult to contest. 
 
F.  Normative Arguments and the Quest for Horizontal Equity 
 
Having established a textual basis for questioning the interpretive soundness of 
the physical-damage requirement, it is worthwhile to compare on normative grounds 
those in the Hardest Hit Communities who suffered permanent damage to their home 
values to others whom the IRC allows to reduce their taxable income by declines in 
their home values attributable to sudden, unexpected and unusual outside forces. 
Doing so introduces the fundamental tax-law principle of “horizontal equity” to the 
discussion.  
Horizontal equity provides that “taxes should bear similarly upon all people in 
similar circumstances.”252 It is widely regarded as a basic yardstick in gauging the 
fairness of any tax system and was also explicitly heralded as one of the central 
organizing principles behind the last comprehensive revision of the IRC undertaken 
pursuant to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.253 Accordingly, when it comes to any 
provision establishing gain or loss, one can expect that the IRC aims to treat 
similarly-situated taxpayers in similar ways and call into question those instances in 
which it does not.  
Part IV.B of this Article explained that the casualty-loss deduction is best 
understood as a normative provision meant to recognize that a taxpayer’s losses to 
personal property that are caused by a sudden, unusual, and unexpected outside force 
should be subtracted from the taxpayer’s income-tax base because they (i) impair 
her ability to pay taxes with respect to the amount lost and (ii) do not represent 
consumption by the taxpayer. Part IV.C. pointed out that Congress enacted the 
MFRDA on identical grounds. Accordingly, this section will compare damage to 
home values incurred by homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities with (i) those 
who conventionally claim the casualty-loss deduction based on physical damage to 
their property and (ii) those who qualify for conceptually similar tax relief under the 
MFRDA according to these normative principles and contend that there is no 
principled reason for distinguishing among them. 
 
                                                 
252 Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 113 
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1.  Comparison with Homeowners Incurring Physical Damage Due to Natural 
Calamity 
 
Consider two homeowners: A and B. In 2005, A bought a home in an area that 
is at a relatively low risk for flooding. A’s standard home insurance policy does not 
cover floods, and A did not seek out additional coverage.254 In the same year, B 
bought a home of equal value in an area that eventually became one of the Hardest 
Hit Communities. In 2007, a hurricane took an unusual course and caused severe 
flooding on A’s property. The resulting physical damage to the home and 
surrounding property, which insurance did not cover, reduced its value by $40,000. 
At the same time, the Foreclosure Crisis caused an identical reduction in the value 
of B’s home. B’s local housing market has, to date, experienced no recovery.   
A and B have suffered equal losses to the values of their homes. Both losses 
were due to sudden, unexpected and unusual outside forces. Assuming A and B are 
in identical financial circumstances, both suffered immediate impairment to their net 
worth of an equal amount and significance that neither anticipated.  
Accordingly, A and B are equally impaired with respect to their ability to pay 
income taxes. Furthermore, if we recognize that a drop in home value due to a 
sudden, unexpected and unusual force is not attributable to consumption, then 
neither A’s nor B’s home value reductions reflect consumption. By these standards, 
it is difficult to justify making A’s loss deductible, but not B’s, merely because B’s 
loss did not result from physical damage.255 
 
2.  Comparison with Homeowners Qualifying for MFRDA 
 
Via the MFRDA, Congress has forgiven income tax on canceled debt for 
certain homeowners who have struggled with their mortgages due to the Foreclosure 
Crisis.256 The MFRDA applies to homeowners who, since 2007, have: (a) agreed on 
a mortgage principal reduction with their lender, (b) sold their homes to third parties 
                                                 
254 Residents of Moderate-to-Low Risk Areas, FLOODSMART.GOV, 
https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/about/when_insurance_is_required.jsp 
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was not completely “unexpected”) and had an insurance option available through the 
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unanticipated and not readily insurable by the average home buyer at the time of the 
Foreclosure Crisis. However, the jurisprudence has not held homeowners like A accountable 
in this respect. 
256 Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, § 2, 121 Stat. 
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in lender-approved short sales to avoid a foreclosure, (c) transferred their homes to 
their lenders in lieu of a foreclosure, or (d) lost their homes in a foreclosure, and 
whose lenders have cancelled a portion of their (the homeowners’) mortgage debt.257 
It is important to recognize that each of the transactions just described results from 
an underlying recognition by homeowner and lender that the home’s value has 
declined. But for a decline in value, most homeowners behind on a mortgage could 
instead sell their home and use the proceeds to pay off what remained on the 
mortgage. The cancelled mortgage debt corresponds roughly to that reduction in 
value. Congress passed the MFRDA in recognition of the fact that the Foreclosure 
Crisis caused these home-value declines.258 
With this in mind, consider two more homeowners: C and D. They both utilized 
mortgages to purchase identical homes in 2005 in the same Hardest Hit Community 
and for the same price of $200,000. By 2011, the values of both homes declined by 
$40,000 and neither has recovered any value. C fell behind on her mortgage 
payments and reached an agreement with her lender to reduce her principal in an 
amount equal to the $40,000 loss in value. So even though she spent $200,000 to 
purchase her home, she will only have to repay $160,000 in principal. D has stayed 
current on her mortgage and will ultimately have to repay the entire $200,000. So, 
D will pay $40,000 more for the same home. 
In normal times, C would have to pay income tax on the $40,000 in principal 
reduction to ensure that none of the dollars she spent in consumption escape income 
tax. For the same reason, neither C nor D could deduct their $40,000 in lost home 
value. Via the MFRDA, C does not need to pay income tax on the $40,000 reduction 
in principal that corresponds to her home’s lost value because, according to the 
testimony supporting the MFRDA, it does not reflect consumption and represents 
$40,000 in home value that no longer exists.259 Absent an allowance for a casualty-
loss deduction, D must still pay taxes on her full purchase price even though she has 
incurred the exact same loss in value. The only significant difference between C and 
D is that D has abided by the original terms of her mortgage. 
When viewed in terms of the normative income-tax principles referenced 
throughout this section, A, B, C, and D are all in the same boat. B and D should be 
able to deduct the permanent damage to their home values as casualty losses to put 
them on equal tax footing with A and C and to accurately measure their income.  
 
VI.  ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES IN UTILIZING THE CASUALTY-LOSS 
DEDUCTION 
 
The Foreclosure Crisis was complex in its onset, progression and aftermath. As 
a result, even though the casualty-loss deduction is a conceptual and normative fit 
for homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities, actually utilizing the deduction for 
this purpose poses several significant administrative challenges. While equity in tax 
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treatment is a fundamental principle on which tax provisions should be evaluated, 
so is the ease (or difficulty) of administration of the provision.260 There are many 
examples of provisions that might serve as normative improvements to the IRC that 
Congress has chosen to omit due to their administrative complexity.261   
This Part will identify and explain each of the principle administrative 
challenges, associated with utilizing the casualty-loss deduction in this context, and, 
where applicable, identify possible solutions. The challenges include (A) defining 
Hardest Hit Communities, (B) measuring casualty loss, (C) determining causation, 
(D) establishing the timeliness of claims, and (E) clarifying the class of eligible 
claimants.  
 
A.  Defining Hardest Hit Communities 
 
Perhaps most fundamental is the question of who actually qualifies to make a 
casualty-loss claim. With home prices nationally still 9% below the pre-Foreclosure 
Crisis peak,262 a very significant number of American homeowners can accurately 
claim that their home has lost value as a result of the Crisis. But many of these 
homeowners live in communities where home values are steadily recovering 
value.263 To allow them to claim a loss runs afoul of the realization rule discussed 
earlier.264  
Assessing which housing markets have permanently transitioned to a lower 
value plateau and thus, where homeowners have actually realized a loss is, 
admittedly, easier said than done and would require careful scrutiny of highly 
localized market data, conditions, and trends. Moreover, the Foreclosure Crisis 
impacted different geographic and demographic areas of the country in different 
ways and at different paces, so it is difficult to devise a standard measuring stick.265 
Some local housing markets would provide clear indicators of permanent damage, 
while those on the margins would be harder to call and highly contestable.  
A related issue is how broadly to draw the geographic boundaries of the Hardest 
Hit Communities. Casting the net too widely would allow some of those whose 
home values are recovering to ride the coattails of homeowners in more distressed 
neighboring communities; casting it too narrowly would exclude those who are 
rightly entitled to the deduction. As Part II explained, state and metropolitan 
boundaries tend to encompass multiple regions, communities, and neighborhoods 
                                                 
260 See, e.g., GRAETZ & SCHENCK, supra note 130, at 32 (identifying “simplicity” as an 
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that are faring in dramatically varying ways with the aftermath of the Foreclosure 
Crisis.266 Data based on zip codes is more granular and better equipped to distinguish 
the most distressed areas, although even some zip codes encompass adjacent 
neighborhoods with radically different housing markets. Census tract267 and census 
block268 data are even more granular and thus potentially useful in isolating damage, 
but not every unit of this size produces enough data to accurately reflect home prices. 
Resolving these eligibility issues on a case-by-case basis, as homeowners make 
their claims, would likely overwhelm the IRS and lead to contradictory outcomes 
and protracted, expensive appeals. It would also create an uneven playing ground 
for claimants, as those with greater means and sophistication could hire more 
qualified advocates and craft stronger arguments in favor of their eligibility. A better 
approach would be for the IRS, in cooperation with the Treasury Department, to 
issue administrative guidance reflecting its position on which areas are Hardest Hit 
Communities. In selecting and drawing appropriate boundaries, the IRS and 
Treasury could consult with other federal agencies, like the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), with expertise in evaluating the impact 
of the Foreclosure Crisis on communities throughout the country.  
The IRS and Treasury provided similar guidance for the homeowners who used 
defective imported, corrosive drywall in their homes between 2001 and 2009. 
Acknowledging homeowners’ numerous inquiries regarding their eligibility for the 
casualty-loss deduction, and what appeared to be case law and previous IRS rulings 
that would categorically prevent their claims, the IRS (citing the Treasury 
Department’s approval) issued Revenue Procedure 2010-36, which recognized 
categories of eligible claimants.269 In so doing, the IRS relied on studies conducted 
by the Federal Consumer Product Safety Commission and HUD.270 Although 
Revenue Procedure 2010-36 did not exclude other homeowners from attempting to 
demonstrate their eligibility for a claim, by creating a “safe harbor” for those who 
they believed merited the deduction, it greatly reduced the costs of eligible claimants 
in proving their claims and the agency’s own administrative burden in ruling on 
them.271 It also served notice to those outside of the safe harbor of the significant 
hurdles they would face in making their cases, probably in the interest of dissuading 
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them from trying to do so.272 Responding similarly to the Foreclosure Crisis could 
likewise smooth the channels for those in the Hardest Hit Communities, while 
discouraging others and providing courts with something to point to in supporting 
the IRS stance in litigation that might emerge.273 
 
B.  Measuring Casualty Loss 
 
Once the Hardest Hit Communities are identified, the next, perhaps most 
daunting, challenge is determining how to measure loss. The conventional approach 
for measuring a casualty loss set forth in the Treasury Regulations is for the taxpayer 
claiming the deduction to obtain and present a competent appraisal of the property 
that assesses and substantiates its decline in value.274 The deductible casualty loss is 
the difference in the property’s fair market value immediately before and 
immediately after the casualty.275 In this era, many private firms are generating 
sophisticated housing market data that tracks property value changes within specific 
zip codes, neighborhoods, and, in some cases, property-by-property on a continuous 
basis,276 which suggests that this information is readily ascertainable by any taxpayer 
with access to the Internet. On the other hand, there is not uniformity in how sources  
 
 
                                                 
272 Id. at 440. 
273 See infra Part VIII for a brief discussion of whether a Revenue Procedure is the 
appropriate mechanism for Treasury Department and IRS action in this instance. 
274 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(2)(i) (2014) (requiring an assessment of a property’s fair 
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visited Nov. 12, 2015) (providing property and financial data, analytics, and services); 
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that provide property values assess them, which could lead to IRS challenges to 
taxpayer assertions of property value declines.277 
A harder question is where to draw the before and after lines. A familiar method 
for assessing the impact of the Foreclosure Crisis is to show the decline in a 
particular market’s home values from its pre-Crisis high point to its subsequent low 
point (“peak to trough”).278 Measuring casualty loss in this way would provide a 
claimant with the maximum possible loss, capturing the entire pre-Crisis run-up in 
prices as well as the entire subsequent drop off as part of the deduction. But when 
assessing loss, is it accurate to limit the Crisis only to that period when prices were 
in free fall? A counterargument is that the premarket crash price run-up reflected 
overvaluation fed by market frenzy that was a critical component of the Crisis, that 
the subsequent bottom point reflected undervaluation caused by the crash, and that 
neither accurately reflected property values.279 By this reasoning, casualty losses are 
smaller (perhaps considerably so) than a peak-to-trough valuation would indicate, 
and instead should be measured by designating the “before point” sometime before 
the market frenzy began and the “after point” at the place where prices ultimately 
stabilized after the acute phase of the Crisis ended. Complicating matters further is 
the fact that different housing markets experienced appreciation, depreciation, and 
recovery at different rates and intensities.280  
The timing of a homeowner’s home purchase is also potentially relevant in 
measuring loss and another complicating factor. Substantial numbers of 
homeowners bought at or near peak value in the years leading up to the Crisis and 
thus using price data from that period seems like the right starting point for 
measuring loss, no matter how short-lived or overexuberant that level of price 
appreciation might have been. A homeowner who bought a home for $200,000 in 
2005 that is now worth $150,000 is $50,000 poorer whether she paid too much for 
her house or not—a reality that will become clear when she sells her home. Her 
neighbor with an identical home who bought it for $150,000 in 2000 has experienced 
the same $50,000 loss in home value since 2005, but he will break even at a sale. A 
peak-to-trough measurement of casualty loss would net the neighbors the same 
deduction. But is this the right result? 
A related problem is accounting for homeowners who made substantial 
improvements to their homes after the Foreclosure Crisis began. The homeowner 
from the previous paragraph may have made an addition to her home in 2009 that 
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raised its fair market value to $175,000. So a peak-to-trough measurement would 
net her a loss of $25,000. $50,000 is probably a more accurate measurement of the 
damage to her home value caused by the Foreclosure Crisis. But a literal application 
of the conventional formula for measuring damage takes into account only the 
home’s overall decline in fair market value between the before and after points. 
These questions of loss valuation would be difficult to resolve and could cause 
severe headaches for the IRS in evaluating claims and litigation from homeowners 
unsatisfied with their recoveries. This is another instance in which administrative 
guidance from the Treasury Department and the IRS could be of some use. 
Anticipating a massive number of casualty-loss claims in the aftermath of three 
hurricanes that rocked the Gulf Coast in 2004 and 2005 and complicated valuation 
issues attendant to the damage they caused, the IRS and the Treasury Department 
issued Revenue Procedure 2006-32.281 The document provided several different 
methods that taxpayers could use to value their property’s damage, reflective of the 
unique circumstances.282 One of these methods introduced a completely novel 
method of computing damage—a cost index simply multiplying a home’s square 
footage by a pre-established factor that varied depending on whether the home was 
small, medium, or large.283 An approach like this could serve as a useful model for 
the Hardest Hit Communities. For example, administrative guidance could provide 
a formula that multiplies a home’s pre-Crisis value by a designated figure that 
reflects a particular community’s overall percentage loss in property values due to 
the Crisis rather than putting the onus on each homeowner to determine how to 
accurately value her damage.   
Revenue Procedure 2006-32 designated the various valuation methods as “safe 
harbors,” but did not exclude the traditional approach of a taxpayer obtaining, 
presenting, and, if necessary, defending an independent appraisal of the property’s 
decline in value, which would invite the valuation debate discussed in the previous 
paragraph.284 One could certainly project, however, that many potential claimants 
would opt for a predetermined valuation if it seemed reasonably fair, thereby 
avoiding the cost, effort, and uncertainty of utilizing their own appraisals.285 
  
                                                 
281 Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61. It is not uncommon for the Treasury 
Department to work with the IRS to issue guidance to reduce controversies regarding asset 
valuation under the tax law. See Letter from Eric Solomon, Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Treasury, to Senator Charles E. Schumer, United States Senate, at *3 (Dec. 11, 2008), 2008 
WL 5381799 (citing Rev. Proc. 2006-32 as an example of the Treasury Department 
providing administrative guidance regarding valuation complexity); see also Rev. Proc. 
2010-36, 2010-42 I.R.B. 439 (creating a safe harbor for valuing damage of corrosive 
drywall). 
282 See Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61, 63–68. 
283 Id. at 65. 
284 See id. at 61–71 (establishing “safe harbor” valuation methods without prohibiting 
a traditional appraisal approach). 
285 See infra Part VIII for a brief discussion of whether a Revenue Procedure is the 
appropriate mechanism for Treasury Department action in this instance.  
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A higher level approach would be for the Treasury Department to amend the 
regulations amplifying § 165 or for Congress to amend IRC § 165 to provide a 
different approach for measuring casualty losses arising from the Foreclosure Crisis. 
The Treasury Department could clarify how the measurement already set forth in § 
1.165-7 applies. Alternatively, the Department or Congress could provide a different 
measurement tailored to fit the unique valuation issues associated with the 
Foreclosure Crisis. 
 
C.  Determining Causation 
 
Assessing the damage to home values in the Hardest Hit Communities during 
the Foreclosure Crisis would undoubtedly raise the question of whether this damage 
was attributable solely to the Crisis or whether other simultaneous and more gradual 
market forces affecting those communities, like job loss, depopulation, and changing 
housing preferences should be taken into account. The applicable Treasury 
Regulations require that the casualty-loss appraisal consider the impact of other 
market forces and calculate the loss based only on the damage caused by the 
casualty.286 This potentially complicates matters in the case at hand (assuming that 
either the IRS has not published valuation safe harbors as proposed above or the 
taxpayer has opted not to use them), since it could be difficult to accurately 
disaggregate these types of historic trends.  
Ultimately, however, the facts support placing the blame for housing-price 
collapses exclusively on the Foreclosure Crisis. Home prices nationwide, even in 
the weakest markets, were on the rise before the Foreclosure Crisis and had been for 
decades, notwithstanding the presence of these other forces.287 Prices suddenly 
nosedived beginning in late 2006 in most markets, even those that previously had 
strong economies, robust demand for housing, and growing populations.288 Thus, it 
seems clear that an independent actor entered the stage in 2006 and caused the free 
fall.  
Where other market forces have played a greater role is in hindering the 
capacity of the Hardest Hit Communities to recover home values. The Hardest Hit 
Communities are located disproportionately in low- and middle-income areas, which 
are considerably more prone to weaker local job markets and declining demand for 
housing.289 Lenders targeted homeowners in these types of communities for 
subprime lending and the Foreclosure Crisis swept many of them away resulting in 
exactly the type of permanent change in neighborhood character described in 
Finkbohner that irreparably damaged home values.290 Other market forces mean that 
there are not ranks of new residents ready to enter and revitalize these communities. 
But this should not make a difference for purposes of measuring casualty losses. If 
                                                 
286 Treas. Reg. § 1.165–7(a)(2)(i) (2014). 
287 See, e.g., S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index, supra note 7. 
288 Id. 
289 See supra Part II.B. 
290 Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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the purpose of the casualty-loss deduction is to allow deduction of the actual loss 
suffered by a taxpayer that results from the casualty, then the focus should be on 
whether the Foreclosure Crisis acted as the precipitating cause of the damage. The 
deduction does not discount recovery for a house more heavily damaged by a 
hurricane because it was built on sand rather than stone; neither should it discount 
the recovery of those who lived in communities less able to withstand the financial 
shock delivered by the Foreclosure Crisis.  
 
D.  Establishing Timeliness of Claims 
 
As a general rule, the Treasury Regulations provide that a casualty-loss 
deduction must be claimed in the year in which the loss is sustained.291 This is 
typically the year in which the casualty occurs.292 When exactly did homeowners in 
the Hardest Hit Communities “sustain” home equity losses? The Crisis began in late 
2006, home prices dropped in most places until late 2011, and some communities 
are still wrestling with the aftermath. The IRS could contend that the Crisis ended at 
the latest when prices bottomed out in 2011 and that the three-year statute of 
limitations has already tolled on any potential claims for losses.293 
Case law provides an important exception to this general rule in circumstances 
in which the full extent of the loss is not immediately known.294 For example, the 
Fifth Circuit allowed a taxpayer to claim, over the objection of the IRS, a casualty 
loss on trees on his property damaged in an ice storm three years after the storm 
occurred.295 The court reasoned that the passage of time was necessary for the 
taxpayer to determine that the damage he suffered was permanent.296 In a similar 
vein, the Treasury Regulations provide that if a casualty damages a taxpayer’s 
property and she has filed a claim for reimbursement of the loss for which there is a 
reasonable prospect of recovery, she does not sustain the loss until she knows with 
reasonable certainty whether she will be reimbursed.297 A similar principle ought to 
apply with respect to Foreclosure Crisis claims. Which communities would recover 
home values and which had suffered permanent damages was not ascertainable to 
industry experts, much less the average homeowner, in the immediate aftermath of 
the Crisis. Only the passage of time could have revealed this. It is only now, several 
                                                 
291 Treas. Reg. § 1.165–7(a)(1). 
292 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES 
AND GIFTS ¶ 34.5.1 (2015), 1997 WL 439671.  
293 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) (2012). Generally, for a credit or refund, a taxpayer must amend 
a tax return within three years (including extensions) after the date it was originally filed or 
within two years after the date a taxpayer paid the applicable tax, whichever is later. Id. 
294 United States v. Barret, 202 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1953); Kunsman v. Comm’r, 49 
T.C. 62, 72 (1967); Lewis v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 196, 198 (2000); Allen v. Comm’r, 
49 T.C.M. (CCH) 238, 239–40 (1984).  
295 Barret, 202 F.2d at 806. 
296 Id. A theft loss is likewise deductible in the year the taxpayer discovers it. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.165-8(a)(2) (2014). 
297 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i). 
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years after prices in some communities began to rebound, that the permanent damage 
is clear and thus claims for deductions are timely. 
This is yet another instance when the Treasury Department and the IRS could 
intervene to clarify matters by designating a reasonable discovery date and alerting 
taxpayers to it. Interestingly, in Revenue Procedure 2010-36 (addressing the 
corrosive drywall claims) they took an even more permissive course than the case 
law exception provides.298 Revenue Procedure 2010-36 recognizes a casualty-loss 
deduction for repair costs in whatever year the claimant pays for the repair.299 Given 
that the directive applied to homeowners who had the corrosive drywall installed in 
their homes between 2001 and 2009 and placed no outer limit on when deductible 
repairs could be made, it is possible that claimants could deduct their casualty loss 
a decade or even longer after the event causing the casualty commenced and in a 
year other than when they discovered the damage.300 The IRS and the Treasury 
Department justified this fairly significant deviation from its general rule simply by 
referring to the “unique circumstances surrounding [the] damage.”301 The unique 
circumstances related to the Foreclosure Crisis should likewise invite a specially 
tailored solution.302 
 
E.  Clarifying the Class of Eligible Claimants 
 
To this point, this Article has usually referred to homeowners in the Hardest 
Hit Communities as though they are a uniform group for purposes of claiming a 
deduction. There are, in reality, differences among them that would affect their 
eligibility for a claim. Two of these are worth discussion here.  
One important difference among homeowners is when they bought and sold 
their homes. Would those who owned homes in the Hardest Hit Communities during 
the Foreclosure Crisis, but no longer do, be eligible to claim a deduction? It is well 
established in tax law that only those who “sustain” a loss can deduct it, which with 
respect to property generally means the person who owns it when the loss occurs.303 
As discussed in the previous section, the jurisprudence supports the notion that a 
taxpayer sustains a casualty loss only when she becomes aware that the damage is 
permanent and will not be reimbursed. This could be interpreted to qualify the 
sizable number of taxpayers who owned homes at some point during the four-year 
period while home prices nosedived and then sold the home at a loss, which could 
arguably serve as the point of discovery. On the other hand, depending on when the 
homeowner sold, the permanence of the damage may not have yet been sufficiently  
 
 
                                                 
298 Rev. Proc. 2010-36, 2010-42 I.R.B. 439. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 See infra Part VIII for a brief discussion of the appropriate mechanism for Treasury 
Department and IRS action in this instance. 
303 Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (RIA) ¶ M–1200. 
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apparent. Furthermore, the IRC’s statute of limitations on amending tax returns 
would, as a general matter and absent congressional intervention, prevent anyone 
who sold their home more than three years ago from claiming a deduction.304  
A second difference is that some homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities 
qualified for the exclusion from tax of cancelled mortgage debt under the 
MFRDA.305 Because the MFRDA already allowed those who qualified to effectively 
subtract the portion of their home’s lost value caused by the Foreclosure Crisis from 
the tax base, these homeowners should not also qualify for a casualty-loss deduction 
for the debt forgiven. The MFRDA already addresses this point by reducing the 
adjusted basis of a home by the amount of cancelled debt on which the homeowner 
did not have to pay tax.306 This would not be an issue for the lion’s share of those 
the MFRDA covered, as most homeowners that qualified for the MFRDA lost or 
transferred their home via the qualifying transaction and thus would probably have 
no subsequent loss in value to claim.307 For that smaller portion of homeowners who 
agreed to principal reductions and stayed in their homes, the casualty loss would 
need to exceed the amount already excluded from tax via the principal reduction and 
only the excess should be deductible.  
 
VII.  DISTRIBUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN UTILIZING THE PERSONAL CASUALTY-
LOSS DEDUCTION 
 
An additional challenge looms. The casualty-loss deduction in its current form 
is an ineffective mechanism for providing meaningful financial relief to most low- 
and middle-income households.308 To the extent that one objective in allowing 
homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities to claim this deduction is to help ease 
the severe blow that the Foreclosure Crisis dealt to their home equity, this fact 
presents a significant problem. A brief explanation of how the deduction functions 
will bring this problem to light. 
The casualty-loss deduction is an itemized deduction against taxable income,309 
and therein lies two challenges. First, a claimant must have taxable income to reduce. 
At present, only 56.7% of Americans actually pay the income tax.310 This is due to 
a variety of circumstances, but the most relevant one to the discussion at hand is that 
                                                 
304 See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra Parts III, IV.C, V.F. 
306 26 U.S.C. § 108(h)(1) (2012); see infra note 341 and accompanying text. 
307 See Goodman & Seidman, supra note 120, at 5 (showing that most transactions that 
qualified under the MFRDA through the end of 2013 have been liquidations). 
308 See, e.g., Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., The Flurry of Tax Law Changes Following the 2005 
Hurricanes: A Strategy for More Predictable and Equitable Tax Treatment of Victims, 72 
BROOK. L. REV. 799, 852 (“[T]here is an overwhelmingly regressive aspect to Section 
165 . . . .”). 
309 26 U.S.C. §§ 63(d), 165. 
310 Tax Topics: Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Taxes?, TAX POL’Y CTR. 
http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/federal-taxes-households.cfm [http://perma.cc/V88K-
N6PH] (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (based on 2013 figures).  
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the current IRC tax structure essentially exempts a substantial portion of low-income 
households from paying income tax. U.S. households in the lowest quintile income 
bracket (i.e., the lowest 20%) rarely pay income tax.311 Even among those in the 
second to lowest quintile bracket, the percentage paying taxes typically is lower than 
50%.312 For those who don’t pay the income tax, the deduction is worthless. Now it 
is also true that rates of home ownership are much higher among middle- and high-
income households than low-income households.313 Accordingly, homes in the 
Hardest Hit Communities are more likely to be owned by its middle- and high-
income residents (i.e., taxpayers) than by its lowest income residents (i.e., 
nontaxpayers). But this will not be true across the board and, thus, it is fair to assume 
that a sizable portion of homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities will be unable 
to utilize the casualty-loss deduction simply because they do not owe any tax. 
A second challenge arises from the fact that a casualty loss is an itemized 
deduction.314 The IRC provides all taxpayers with the option of taking a 
predetermined standard deduction from their taxable income rather than 
itemizing.315 As a result, itemized deductions are only of value to those for whom 
the sum of all of their itemized deductions exceed the standard deduction. Only 
approximately 30% of U.S. taxpayers itemize deductions each year, and higher-
income households are more likely to itemize than lower-income households 
because high-income households are more likely to have enough itemized expenses 
to make itemizing worthwhile.316 This statistic is actually a little misleading in 
indicating who would take advantage of a casualty-loss deduction if it were available 
for homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities. If a lower- or middle-income 
                                                 
311 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 30 (2014) (showing the lowest 
quintile income bracket for 2013 are those households making less than $20,900 per year); 
Tax Topics: Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Taxes?, supra note 310 (presenting via video that 
99.5% of those making less than $10,000 per year do not pay federal income tax and 86.2% 
of those making between $10,000 and $20,000 per year do not pay). 
312 See DENAVAS-WALT & PROCTOR, supra note 311, at 30 tbl.A-2 (showing the second 
to lowest quintile income bracket for 2013 are those households making more than $20,900 
per year but less than $40,187); Tax Topics: Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Taxes?, supra note 
310 (illustrating that 66.7% of those making more than $20,000 but less than $30,000 per 
year do not pay federal income tax and 49.3% of those making between $30,000 and $40,000 
per year do not pay). 
313 See Press Release, Robert R. Callis & Melissa Kresin, U.S. Census Bureau, 
Residential Vacancies and Homeownership in the Second Quarter 2014, at 10 tbl.8 (July 29, 
2014) (charting the discrepancy between one-unit structures and two-unit structures); U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 
2011, at 27 tbl.C-09-AO (2013) (providing data showing that the rates of home ownership 
are much higher among middle- and high-income households than low-income households). 
314 26 U.S.C. §§ 63(d), 165. 
315 Id. § 63(e). 
316 See SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., R43012, ITEMIZED TAX DEDUCTIONS 
FOR INDIVIDUALS: DATA ANALYSIS 2 (2014) (“In 2011, 32% of all tax filers chose to itemize 
their deductions rather than claim the standard deduction.”).  
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taxpayer had a significant casualty loss, there is a much greater likelihood that his 
or her itemized deductions would exceed the standard deduction that year and, 
therefore, make itemizing worthwhile. Still, the value of a casualty-loss deduction 
would, in the aggregate, be reduced or completely offset for some additional low- 
and middle-income taxpayers because it is itemized.317 
There is also a floor on the casualty-loss deduction that further limits its value 
to all taxpayers. A taxpayer can deduct only that portion of a casualty loss that 
exceeds 10% of his or her adjusted gross income (the “AGI Adjustment”).318 So, for 
example, if a household in one of the Hardest Hit Communities has a combined 
adjusted gross income of $70,000 in a particular year and seeks to claim a casualty 
loss for $40,000, the AGI Adjustment would reduce this claim by $7,000 to 
$33,000.319  
Finally, as a general matter, most tax-code deductions are significantly more 
valuable to higher-income taxpayers than they are to middle- and lower-income 
taxpayers. This is because a taxpayer’s income is not taxed at a uniform rate; instead, 
different rates apply to different segments of a taxpayer’s income with the rates 
increasing as income gets higher.320 A deduction reduces a taxpayer’s overall taxable 
income and, thus, its value depends on the rate at which the deducted income would 
have been taxed. Using 2014 tax brackets, a married couple with a combined annual 
taxable income of $70,000 and a casualty-loss deduction, after the AGI Adjustment, 
of $33,000, would realize a tax savings of approximately $4,950 because that portion 
of their income that exceeds $18,150 but is not greater than $73,800 is taxed at a 
15% rate.321 A married couple with a combined annual taxable income of $140,000 
and the same $40,000 casualty loss would have their deduction reduced by the AGI 
adjustment to $26,000, but then realize a tax savings of approximately $6,500 on 
this loss, because that portion of their income greater than $73,800 but less than 
$148,800 is taxed at a 25% rate.322 In fact, this paragraph has oversimplified the 
comparison for ease of discussion and the lower-income couple would probably 
receive even less of a tax benefit relative to the higher-income couple.323 
                                                 
317 Id. at 7 (discussing the implications of the value of itemized deductions). 
318 26 U.S.C. § 165(h)(2). 
319 Section 165 also imposes a separate $100 de minimis floor, and thus the claimed 
loss would actually be further reduced to $32,900. Id. §165(h)(1). It is also possible, although 
fairly unlikely given the nature of home-value declines caused by the Foreclosure Crisis, that 
a casualty-loss deduction could be limited by the property’s adjusted basis. Treas. Reg. § 
1.165-7(b)(1)(ii) (2014). For further discussion of adjusted basis, see infra note 335 and 
accompanying text.  
320 See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 35–38 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing why progressive 
income tax rates are used).  
321 See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 538–42 (providing supporting data). 
322 See id. 
323 First, the de minimis reduction imposed by 26 U.S.C. § 165(h)(1) would reduce the 
amount the taxpayer could deduct by $100 to $32,900. See supra note 319 and accompanying 
text. Of greater consequence is the extent to which the sum of the taxpayer’s other itemized 
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There is an extent to which this is an equitable outcome. Viewed through the 
nonconsumption rationale, the casualty-loss deduction is meant simply to remove 
unconsumed personal losses from the tax base.324 Because this loss would otherwise 
be taxed at the highest marginal tax rate the taxpayer pays, taxpayers in higher tax 
brackets will necessarily stand to benefit more from a deduction. This logic also 
applies using the ability to pay taxes rationale if the deduction’s purpose is merely 
meant to remove wealth that the taxpayer no longer possesses from her tax base. 
Where it is unsatisfactory from a normative (and policy) perspective is if the impact 
of the loss on the taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes is considered relative to her other 
resources. Viewed this way, it is hard to ignore that a $33,000 loss in net worth will 
almost always have a more adverse impact on the financial outlook of a household 
with $70,000 in yearly taxable income than it does for one with $140,000 in income. 
Not only is the loss not of equal tax value for these two households, it is the wealthier 
household that benefits more.  
 
VIII.  MODIFYING THE PERSONAL CASUALTY-LOSS DEDUCTION FOR 
HOMEOWNERS IN THE HARDEST HIT COMMUNITIES 
 
The previous two sections identified a variety of challenges to utilizing the 
casualty-loss deduction, as currently configured, to address the permanent damage 
to home values suffered by homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities. This is 
not to say, however, that the deduction in its current form is completely untenable 
for these types of claims.  
If the Treasury Department can be convinced of the merits of a claim to the 
deduction in this context, it could work with the IRS, as it has in the wake of other 
recent complex casualties, to issue agency guidance that addresses many of the 
administrative challenges.325 As identified in Part VI, the Treasury Department has 
utilized IRS revenue procedures to create casualty-specific safe harbors that identify 
eligible claimants, alternative methods of damage valuation, and revised timelines 
for claiming the deduction, and could try to do so again in this instance.326 This 
                                                 
deductions falls short of the standard deduction. For 2014, the standard deduction for a 
married couple filing a joint tax return is $12,400. See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 
541. If the couple’s other itemized deductions only amount to $3,000, then the net value of 
the casualty-loss deduction is reduced from $32,900 to $23,900 (by subtracting the additional 
$9,400 in deductions that the standard deduction would have provided). At a 15% tax rate, 
the tax savings is $3,585, for approximately a 9% return on the home’s lost value. By 
contrast, the wealthier household with $140,000 in adjusted gross income would likely 
already be an itemizer and thus recoup the full $6,500, or approximately 16% on the home’s 
lost value.   
324 See supra Part IV.B. 
325 See supra Part VI. 
326 A revenue procedure is an “official statement of a procedure by the [IRS] that affects 
the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the [IRC], related 
statutes, tax treaties, and regulations, or information that, although not necessarily affecting 
the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.” INTERNAL 
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guidance would need to stay within the bounds of what § 165(c)(3) provides, and 
some might question whether recognizing nonphysical damage as a casualty loss 
exceeds those boundaries. But with Finkbohner representing a split among circuit 
courts on this issue and the recent use of revenue procedures to recognize and 
facilitate casualty-loss claims in other “unique circumstances,”327 the Department 
would appear to have some room to maneuver in working with the IRS to issue 
agency guidance.328 A more authoritative approach would be for the Department to 
issue interpretive regulations to implement these strategies.329 The ease of 
adoption,330 functional scope,331 and degree of judicial deference332 vary 
significantly among the different types of regulatory and rule-making devices the 
                                                 
REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.2.2.3.2 (2004). Depending on the 
subject matter of the guidance, a revenue ruling, or a revenue ruling in combination with a 
revenue procedure, may be more appropriate. A revenue ruling is an “official interpretation 
by the [IRS] of the [IRC], related statutes, tax treaties, and regulations. It is the conclusion 
of the [IRS] on how the law is applied to a specific set of facts.” Id. § 32.2.2.3.1.  
327 Revenue Procedure 2010-36 justified the recognition of damage caused by corrosion 
as a casualty loss “in view of the unique circumstances” and notwithstanding a seemingly 
contradictory Second Circuit opinion, Matheson v. Comm’r, 54 F.2d 537, 539–40 (2d Cir. 
1931), and a seminal Revenue Ruling, 72-592, 1972-2 C.B. 101, on this issue. Rev. Proc. 
2010-36, 2010-42 I.R.B. 439, 439; see supra notes 215–218 and accompanying text. 
Likewise, Revenue Procedure 2006-32 justified the creation of new methods for valuing fair 
market value decline associated with a casualty loss “in view of the unique circumstances” 
and congressional action lifting statutory floors on the deduction, which was unrelated to the 
question of valuing damage. Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61, 61. 
328 The question of who possesses standing to challenge Treasury Department and IRS 
guidance expanding the availability of a deduction is an interesting one, but it is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
329 The Treasury Department has the authority to issue interpretive regulations that 
implement and interpret the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
330 As a general matter, the process for adoption of a regulation is significantly more 
onerous and time-consuming than that for issuance of agency guidance, as it typically 
requires a public notice and comment period. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
supra note 326, at § 32.1 (providing an overview of the regulatory process).  
331 See supra notes 326 and 329. 
332 Treasury regulations require very expansive Chevron deference from courts and, if 
on a point not directly addressed in the statute, can only be overturned if “arbitrary or 
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. 
& Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011) (citations omitted). In addition, 
“[r]evenue rulings are entitled to great deference, but courts may disregard them if they 
conflict with the statute they purport to interpret or its legislative history, or if they are 
otherwise unreasonable.” In re Kaplan, 104 F.3d 589, 599 (3d Cir. 1997). “While courts 
generally regard a revenue ruling as an official interpretation by the [IRS], a revenue 
procedure instead is seen as merely a statement of procedure” and not mandatory. 1 Casey 
Fed. Tax Prac. § 1:41 (2015). On the other hand, it is not uncommon for the Treasury 
Department to address significant issues related to loss valuation in revenue procedures and 
other less precedential documents. See, e.g., Letter from Eric Solomon, supra note 281, at 
*3. 
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Department can utilize and so it would need to consider which combination of 
regulations and agency guidance represents the best and most appropriate option in 
this instance.   
The distributional challenge, on the other hand, cannot be addressed without 
congressional intervention. No executive branch actor can unilaterally remove the 
ceilings and floors imposed on the casualty-loss deduction or change the basic 
mechanism by which it is delivered, all of which are established by § 165 of the IRC. 
The deduction in its current form would not be worthless. Middle- and upper-income 
homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities could utilize it to recoup a portion of 
their damaged home values on par with recoveries due to more conventional casualty 
losses. Nevertheless, as Part VII detailed, those with the lowest incomes would 
receive either no deductions or the smallest ones relative to their damage suffered, 
which is to some extent an unsatisfactory outcome.333 
More could be done to address the unresolved administrative and distributional 
challenges and in so doing better accomplish the normative objectives underlying 
the casualty-loss deduction. But this would involve more fundamental modifications 
to how the casualty-loss deduction functions in this instance. This Part will consider 
two such modifications: (A) changing the standard for measuring loss to one that is 
more reflective of the actual loss suffered by individual homeowners and (B) making 
the loss more fully deductible.  
 
A.  Changing the Approach for Measuring the Casualty Loss of Homeowners 
in the Hardest Hit Communities 
 
As discussed in Part VI.B, a perplexing administrative challenge to recognizing 
any casualty-loss claims for damage to home values caused by the Foreclosure Crisis 
is how to value the loss. Casting this as purely an administrative issue camouflages 
the underlying equity issue of what constitutes an appropriate deduction in this 
context. 
In its current form, § 1.165-7 of the Treasury Regulations provides that the 
casualty-loss deduction shall be limited to “the actual loss resulting from damage to 
the property,” which is either “the fair market value of the property immediately 
before and immediately after the casualty . . . [as] ascertained by competent 
appraisal” or “the cost of repairs to the property damaged.”334 The former approach 
raises the difficulties, explained in Part VI, inherent in trying to value the impact of 
such a complex event that affected individual communities and homeowners in 
different ways. The latter approach simply does not apply in circumstances where 
there is not physical damage. 
A logical alternative is the IRC’s standard rules for measuring gain or loss upon 
a taxpayer’s sale of a primary residence. In brief, upon sale a taxpayer calculates her 
“adjusted basis” in her home (i.e., her initial cost of acquiring the home plus or minus 
subsequent adjustments to the home’s cost) and subtracts the adjusted basis from 
                                                 
333 See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
334 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(2) (2014). 
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what she realizes upon sale.335 If the difference is a positive number, she has taxable 
gain, which is often excluded from tax.336 If it is a negative number, it is a loss that 
is nondeductible, as explained earlier, because it is assumed to reflect personal 
consumption.337 
Congress could amend § 165(c)(3) or the Treasury Department could amend 
the interpretive regulations to create an exception in this instance and allow the 
homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities to deduct their losses when they sell 
their homes.338 Doing so makes the same assumption about the losses these 
homeowners would incur upon sale as has been generally made about reductions in 
home prices incurred in the aftermath of the Foreclosure Crisis throughout this 
Article: that they arose from unprecedented and unexpected financial turmoil, rather 
than personal consumption. This change would fix the point of discovery of the loss 
at sale rather than leaving it to the IRS and homeowners to determine when a 
particular community’s transition to a lower value plateau became permanent. 
This approach may be a better fit for measuring a casualty loss in this instance 
for several practical reasons. First, the rule can be uniformly applied by the IRS, no 
matter the Hardest Hit Community in which the claimant resides, and provides a 
relatively clear formula for measuring loss. Second, it is a calculation commonly 
made by accountants and homeowners and so well-established rules and standards 
for making the calculation exist. Third, the sale of a home is undeniably a realization 
event and, thus, avoids potential disagreement (and litigation) over when a particular 
community has completed its transition to a lower value plateau.  
Furthermore, and perhaps most critically for normative purposes, it is probably 
more reflective of the actual loss suffered by individual homeowners due to the 
Foreclosure Crisis. It addresses squarely the problems identified earlier in this 
Article of how to accurately determine home-value declines that affected 
homeowners in the same community differently based on when they bought and 
made improvements to their homes. As discussed in Part VI, it would be unfair and 
inaccurate to disregard inflated, pre-Crisis price run-ups for those homeowners who 
had the misfortune of buying their homes right before the Foreclosure Crisis at or 
near price peaks. Using the home sale measurement model takes this into account 
because the purchase price is the starting point in determining adjusted basis and, 
ultimately, loss. On the other hand, a homeowner who purchased several years 
before prices began to run up would, theoretically, not take a greater loss than 
merited because she would also be starting with her purchase price. This approach 
also addresses homeowners who made substantial improvements to their home in 
the midst or aftermath of the Foreclosure Crisis.339 “Adjusted basis” takes into 
account the cost a homeowner incurs in making those improvements, while a fair  
 
                                                 
335 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012, 1016 (2012). 
336 See id. § 121. 
337 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a); see supra Part IV.A. 
338 Treasury Regulation §§ 1.165-7 and 1.165-9 would require amendments. 
339 See supra Part VI.B. 
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market value approach may perversely cause the improvements to reduce the 
homeowner’s loss.340  
Using the home sale loss measurement approach also disposes of the problem 
of allowing a homeowner to take a loss that the homeowner later recoups through 
unexpected market appreciation. Because the homeowner does not take the loss until 
the home is sold, any home value recoveries up to the point of sale would not be 
included in the loss. This probably would not have a great impact on losses in most 
Hardest Hit Communities because they are, by definition, housing markets that have 
not and are not expected to experience significant price recoveries anytime soon. 
But this would at least prevent pockets of these communities and individual 
homeowners whose homes have recovered significantly from deducting unmerited 
losses. 
Ultimately, the home sale loss alternative, in its current form, is not a perfect 
solution. It assumes all reductions in home value in the Hardest Hit Communities 
are attributable to the Foreclosure Crisis. This would not be true for all homes, 
especially if a homeowner continues to own her home well into the future. A possible 
fix is to reflect depreciation of the home over time at an annual rate in adjusted 
basis.341 It also risks understating loss for longtime, pre-Crisis homeowners whose 
homes had appreciated according to “normal” (i.e., pre-2000) home value rates, but 
now have fallen below that figure due to localized housing market damage caused 
by the Foreclosure Crisis. A possible remedy would be to allow this type of 
homeowner to substantiate the home’s fair market value at a designated time (prior 
to the pre-Crisis price run-ups) and substitute it for adjusted basis in measuring loss 
upon resale.  
 
B.  Making the Loss More Fully Deductible 
 
To address the distributional challenge, Congress could remove the limitations 
on recovery it normally imposes on the casualty-loss deduction for homeowners in 
the Hardest Hit Communities.342 The principal limitations, discussed in detail earlier 
in the Article, are the AGI Adjustment and the requirement that the loss be claimed 
as an itemized deduction.343 Removing these limits would make the deduction 
                                                 
340 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012, 1016. 
341 Real property held for business or investment purposes is assumed to depreciate. 
But this depreciation is deductible because the property is utilized in profit-seeking activity. 
See supra Part IV. The depreciation of a personal residence should theoretically not be 
deductible as it would be attributable to personal consumption. See Epstein, supra note 149, 
at 457–62. 
342 This Article does not call for removal of the limitation that the loss not exceed the 
property’s adjusted basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(2). This reflects the longstanding rule 
that a taxpayer’s loss of property cannot exceed her investment in that property. In addition, 
it has not been removed in the other casualties in which Congress has intervened. 
343 As explained supra in note 319, Section 165 also imposes a separate $100 floor on 
the casualty-loss deduction. This limitation is not discussed separately here because it does 
not significantly reduce recovery and is typically removed in those instances when Congress 
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available to more low- and middle-income homeowners in the Hardest Hit 
Communities and increase the amount of their deductions. 
These limitations are, for the most part, driven by non-normative objectives. 
Congress imposed the AGI Adjustment in 1984,344 motivated in large part by 
concerns that taxpayers frequently claimed the casualty-loss deduction erroneously 
making it challenging for the IRS to regulate.345 By screening out all claims not 
amounting to more than 10% of a taxpayer’s income, Congress hoped to reduce the 
number of claimants and, thus, alleviate the agency’s auditing burden.346 The AGI 
Adjustment was also part of a broader package of amendments to the IRC 
specifically aimed at increasing federal revenue in anticipation of federal budget 
deficits.347 So the AGI Adjustment reduced all casualty-loss recoveries by an amount 
equal to 10% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income as a way of increasing tax 
revenue.348 The designation of the casualty-loss deduction as an itemized deduction 
appears to owe more to the point in time at which it was adopted rather than to any 
consistently applied normative principle.349 The bottom line in how the deduction 
currently operates is that taxpayers justified on normative grounds in taking a full 
deduction for casualty losses (because they do not reflect consumption or they affect 
the taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes) are limited or prevented from doing so based on 
other factors.  
Congress has selectively lifted these limitations for specific groups of casualty-
loss claimants when it has perceived that they are obstructing getting sufficient aid 
to communities in crisis and no longer effectively serve the purpose for which they 
were adopted. For example, Congress removed the AGI Adjustment for residents in 
portions of the Gulf Coast states struck by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 
2005.350 It contemplated the same treatment for those who suffered damages as a 
result of the Gulf Oil Spill and Superstorm Sandy.351 It went one step further for 
                                                 
removes the AGI Adjustment. Furthermore, it is also possible, although fairly unlikely given 
the nature of home-value declines caused by the Foreclosure Crisis, that a casualty-loss 
deduction could be limited by the amount of the property’s adjusted basis. 
344 26 U.S.C. § 165(h)(2). 
345 S. REP. NO. 97-494(I), at 82–109 (1982). 
346 Id. 
347 Joint Committee on Taxation, “General Explanation of the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982,” (December 31, 1982) at 13–14. 
348 26 U.S.C. § 165(h)(2). Congress justified the structure of the AGI Adjustment as 
also reflective of ability to pay concerns; the imposition of the adjustment would reduce the 
claims of higher-income taxpayers more than lower-income ones. But ultimately this is best 
interpreted as a way of easing the impact on lower-income taxpayers of what was essentially 
a provision aimed at administrative ease and revenue. 
349 Brooks, supra note 151, at 214–15. 
350 See Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 402, 119 Stat. 
2016, 2027; Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, § 201, 119 Stat. 2577, 
2596–2608 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1400S(b) (2012)). 
351 See, e.g., MOLLY F. SHERLOCK ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41323, TAX 
ISSUES AND THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PAYMENTS AND TAX 
RELIEF POLICY OPTIONS 10 (2010); Investment Savings Access After Catastrophes Act of 
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residents of portions of several Midwestern states inundated by storms, floods, and 
tornadoes in 2008, by not only removing the AGI Adjustment, but also allowing 
residents to claim the loss on top of their standard deduction.352  
All of these situations involved events that indisputably qualified as disasters 
or casualties that caused widespread and obvious damage. Given these 
circumstances, the AGI Adjustment ceased to act as an effective filter of 
inconsequential or unmerited claims. Moreover, they involved events for which the 
government already intended to provide direct financial assistance to those most 
seriously impacted, and thus, budgetary objectives were no longer paramount.  
Homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities merit similar treatment. As 
explained throughout this Article, the impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on these 
Communities was widespread, catastrophic, incontrovertible, and certainly on par 
with the financial damages suffered by those in other circumstances in which 
Congress has made the casualty-loss deduction more fully deductible.353 Moreover, 
the federal government has already provided direct financial assistance to banks, 
mortgage guarantors, and certain subsets of homeowners affected by the Foreclosure 
Crisis.354 Accordingly, the budgetary justifications for limiting the availability and 
value of the deduction can easily be overcome in this instance for those homeowners 
who have received virtually no assistance to this point.  
It also worth pointing out that those taxpayers aided by the MFRDA are able to 
exclude all of their damaged home values, to the extent it was represented by 
discharged debt, from income tax. Because the MFRDA acts as an exclusion of gain 
from taxable income, rather than as a deduction, it is not subject to any of the floors 
and limits that apply to the casualty-loss deduction.355 Because there is no 
meaningful distinction between the permanent home value losses suffered by those 
covered by the MFRDA and those suffered by homeowners in the Hardest Hit 
Communities, as a matter of horizontal equity, the latter should be deductible to the 
same extent as the former. 
Taken together, the removal of the AGI Adjustment and allowing the casualty-
loss deduction to be taken on top of the standard deduction for those who would not 
otherwise itemize, would certainly make casualty losses more fully deductible for 
homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities. Not all of the distributional issues 
would be resolved, however. For those homeowners who do not pay income tax in 
the year in which the deduction would be claimed, the deduction would still be 
worthless. A sizable number of homeowners in the Hardest Hit Communities may 
fall into this category. In addition, the return on a home’s lost value yielded by taking 
the deduction would still be relatively small for lower income individuals due to 
their lower marginal tax rates.356 Because many homeowners in the Hardest Hit 
                                                 
2012, H.R. 453, 113th Cong. (2013). 
352 Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 706, 122 Stat. 
3912, 3921–23 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 165 (2012)). 
353 See supra Parts II, V.A. 
354 See supra Part III. 
355 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
356 See supra Part VII. 
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Communities are low- and middle-income, a large number would recoup only 10% 
to 15% of their lost home value as tax savings.357 Nevertheless, the deduction could 
be claimed by many more in the Hardest Hit Communities and in greater amounts 
than would otherwise be the case under existing rules.  
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Foreclosure Crisis wreaked havoc on the finances of American households 
in a manner and to a degree not seen in almost a century. While most areas of the 
country are well on the road to recovery, the Crisis caused fundamental damage to 
the housing markets of some communities resulting in home-value declines that bear 
little hope of a meaningful recovery in the near future. Homeowners in these Hardest 
Hit Communities have suffered a serious economic loss on what is likely their 
principal asset, due in most cases to circumstances completely beyond their own 
control. 
The best long-term approach to remedying this situation may very well reside 
in a comprehensive package of carefully crafted policies aimed specifically at fixing 
housing markets in the Hardest Hit Communities—for example, geographically 
targeted home purchase tax credits along with public sector investments in housing 
rehabilitation, strategic demolition, and neighborhood stabilization programs. The 
federal government spends billions of dollars annually in tax incentives to bolster 
the American housing market, many of which are principally of value to high-
income taxpayers who have relatively little need for them.358 The redirection of these 
dollars to those in the Hardest Hit Communities in order to restore confidence in 
their housing markets would be a more effective and equitable approach to 
accomplish the government’s stated objective of promoting home ownership. But 
the likelihood of generating the political will to marshal a comprehensive solution 
and oversee its implementation in a way that meaningfully impacts home values 
within the ownership tenure of most of those who bought homes in the Hardest Hit 
Communities prior to or in the midst of the Foreclosure Crisis is increasingly 
unlikely as time passes.  
Given this, the proposal made in this Article is a fairly modest one. It simply 
proposes that the IRC permit these homeowners to deduct permanent damage to their 
home values from their taxable income on the same grounds as others who suffer a 
serious economic loss due to a sudden, unexpected, and unusual event. Once these 
homeowners are considered equally worthy of claiming a casualty loss, the question 
then shifts to how the IRS, the Treasury Department, and Congress can best address 
                                                 
357 Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537. 
358 See, e.g., Benjamin H. Harris et al., New Perspectives on Homeownership Tax 
Incentives, 2013 TAX NOTES 1315, 1315; Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent 
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the administrative and distributional challenges attendant to utilizing the casualty-
loss deduction in this context. These challenges are not insurmountable barriers, but 
rather issues to be carefully considered and strategically addressed. This Article 
presents a template for how to do so, and, in so doing, restore a measure of lost 
equity, economic justice, and confidence in home ownership to homeowners in the 
housing markets most severely damaged by the Foreclosure Crisis. 
